

the power blocs could be reached.²

One could blame the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council which has been used, or misused, by all of them at one time or another. However, the veto is symbolic of disunity of the member states in the Security Council. Consequently, the UN cannot act effectively to implement measures against any aggressor. But even if UN member states could agree on the formation of a peace enforcement agency, who would decide who is the aggressor and who the victim? Who would decide who is the guilty party in any given conflict and who should be helped by the UN? Just as difficult is the question of how strong an international peace force should be in order to be credible and effective. We only have to remember the Iran-Iraq War or the conflicts in the Middle East to grasp this point about operational difficulties.

Nations could hardly be blamed if they did not want to join regional associations formed and directed by the UN. The fear of unacceptable decisions being made by the UN General Assembly or by the Security Council, influenced by distant political considerations, would be enough to cause hesitancy. While some UN help might be desirable, especially if combined with that of certain countries such as Canada or the Scandinavian states, unpredictable interference from outside the region would run counter to the purpose of these largely autonomous regional associations.

Thus, there are good reasons for countries to adopt voluntarily new solutions to regional conflict problems. However, national sovereignty has to be respected; agreements

² For more detailed discussion on this subject see: Arnold Simoni, Beyond Repair, Collier Macmillan, Toronto, 1972.