

If the number attending is as large next year the staff and officers will have to be increased.

There was very nearly an accident in the team firing. Sgt.-Major Tresham was drilling one team and instructing them in the manner of firing. This was done with the rifles empty, the men being told not to put cartridges in until given the command by Col. Gwyn. This team, however, either did not understand or were careless for when officer Tresham gave the word to fire the soldiers did fire and each rifle was loaded. Fortunately no one stood in front.—*Dundas Star*.

The War Between China and Japan.

NARRATIVE UP TO DATE.

BY COLONEL MAURICE.

From the United Service Magazine.

I think that it is possible from the information that we have now received to clear up to some extent the situation in Korea. We have some letters from both Chemulpho, Soul, Yokohama, and Shanghai, which fairly establish certain facts. Starting from these, I do not think it is difficult to interpret some of the confused telegrams. Much of the confusion arises, I think, from the attempt to produce in print phonetically names which have been differently rendered in our maps from a different reproduction of the sounds of the Korean language. As it has taken me some labor to make out the facts to my own satisfaction, I may perhaps be able to save others trouble by telling the story as I believe it to have run. Though some errors may require subsequent correction, it will, I think, be useful to those who have relations with the East, and interesting to most readers, to have from time to time a summary of the best news that has reached us. It requires perhaps a little experience of the necessary conditions under which troops act to be able to distinguish between what is at least highly probable and what is altogether impossible.

It will be remembered then that in the spring a rebellion had broken out in the southern provinces of Korea. The king's troops were defeated by the rebels. Some of the soldiers appear to have fraternized with the revolted people. Altogether the situation became so threatening that the king's government appealed to the Emperor of China for assistance. It was believed in China and reported to Yokohama that the Chinese intended to send 10,000 troops. In fact, however, a force of only 2000 men were landed at Asan. They appear to have arrived at Asan, or Gazan as it is also called, early in June. By June 22nd, however, a correspondent writing from Yokohama, states that up to that date these troops had been unable to leave Asan from their entire want of provisions for a campaign. As soon as the Japanese government heard of the despatch of these troops they promptly despatched a force which at first numbered between 4000 and 5000 men to Chemulpho. They notified to the Chinese Government their intention to despatch these troops. They claimed that, under the treaty of April 18th, 1885, each government was bound to notify to the other the despatch of troops to the country; and each country after such notice was at liberty to send them. They announced that as China, apparently without notice to them, had already despatched troops to suppress the rebellion, they were now despatching their force to watch over their interests in Korea. Of the landing of these troops we have a very interesting and complete account, which

was sent to the *Times* by a thoroughly independent authority. He tells us that nothing could be more complete than their equipment; that they maintained admirable order, and that they in a short time occupied practically without opposition Soul, the capital. Now, as the great mass of any Chinese army which is to enter Korea must cross the northern frontier and approach by land, it is evident that this force lying between Insen or Yinsen, as it is variously rendered, and Soul, lay between the Chinese forces to the south at Asan (or Yashan) and their friends in the north. Now as the distance from the Chinese frontier and Soul is at least 200 miles of very difficult country, as the Chinese army gathers slowly and must have some sort of equipment before it starts, it is obvious that, as long as this detachment of Chinamen at Asan were not reinforced by sea, they would be completely at the mercy of the much better equipped and much larger force of Japanese lying to the north of them at Yinsen and Soul. The Japanese continued steadily to pour in troops at Chemulpho. It was during this condition of affairs that the *Kowsing* incident took place. We do not know accurately how many Chinese troops were embarked with this expedition. It is said that 1100 Chinamen were sunk in the *Kowsing*. Apparently very few, if any, of the transports succeeded in reaching Asan. Most, we know, put back to the Petcheli Gulph.

Now what would naturally be, under these circumstances, the objects of the Japanese commander in Soul and the Chinese commander in Asan? It may, I think, be safely assumed that the Japanese forces, whatever their numerical strength may have been by the latter part of July, were as a fighting force greatly superior to the Chinese in Asan. It is highly improbable that the Chinese after such a disaster as that to the *Kowsing*, would attempt to send any more reinforcements by sea until they were able to dispose of the Japanese fleet. Therefore the Chinese force at Asan must have felt itself to be cut off from all hope of reinforcement, except by the march of the Chinese army from the north. Under these circumstances the object of the Chinese commander, if he found himself able to move, would be if possible to slip past the Japanese force and move northward. It would be far too dangerous for him to attempt to carry out the mission with which the Chinese troops had been originally entrusted, that of suppressing the rebellion in the south. To do so would be to expose his ill-equipped army to be caught under most disadvantageous circumstances by the easily mobile Japanese force among a hostile population. Therefore, he would have to consider how best to escape northwards. Clearly to pass directly north, between the sea-coast and Soul, would be unwise. The Japanese, as we are told, have carefully entrenched the position they have taken up between Soul and the sea. Therefore his one chance would be to pass in a north-easterly direction round Soul and endeavor to avoid the Japanese. As clearly the object of the Japanese commander would be to prevent this attempt and to destroy this isolated force of Chinamen before the great Chinese army from the north could arrive. On the other hand if the Chinese commander did not find himself sufficiently equipped for so long a march he would necessarily endeavor to protect his position at Asan by taking as strong a line as he could at a moderate distance from Asan and fronting the Japanese. In either of these cases a glance at the map furnished by the Intelligence Department, and to be obtained from Stanford, will show that a place which is there spelled

Suwon would probably be occupied by the Chinese army as soon as they were able to march out of Asan.

Now we have had reports of two engagements, one said to have been about July 27th or 28th, in which the Chinese are said to have defeated the Japanese with great loss, and one on July 29th, in which the Japanese are said to have totally defeated the Chinese and taken what is called in the telegram Seikwan. This place I take to be the Suwon of our map. The difference in spelling is not at all more than one is accustomed to in barbarous countries. It is scarcely greater than the variations of reading given in this map for one place, Inchon, Yenchuan, Yinsen. Further, the Chinese are said to have fled in the direction of Kos-hu. This I take to be the Yo-Ju of the map. The Japanese are then said to have captured Asan or Yashan. That is to say, that they pushed on and seized the harbor where the Chinese had originally disembarked. Discredit was thrown on this report because the Japanese commander reported only that he had inflicted a loss of 500 men killed and wounded. I think that this view must be due to a misconception of the facts. What we are here dealing with is not a fight with the Chinese army of the north but with the body, originally about 2000 strong, which was sent to suppress the Korean rebellion. It may have been somewhat strengthened by the transports which escaped after the sinking of the *Kowsing* on July 25th, but as the fighting took place so soon after that event it seems unlikely. In any case a loss of 500 for such a body would be a very heavy one, and may fully account for the alleged dispersion of this force. On the other hand the fact that the Chinese "fled" or retreated towards Yo-Ju would imply that whatever remained as an active army after the fight continued its endeavor to work round the Japanese northwards. It ought to find great difficulty in escaping. It would have 200 miles of very bad country to traverse with the Japanese army on its flank for great part of the distance.

It is of course impossible to say what policy the Japanese leaders may follow, but if they leave to the Chinese the difficult task of advancing upon the position they have taken up at Soul, holding only the passes in the mountains, then I hardly see how any very serious operations can take place between the main Chinese army and the Japanese till nearly the end of the season. A Chinese army moves very slowly; the country is almost without roads and over mountains difficult to pass. The gathering of the Chinese army on the frontier cannot yet have taken place and must be a slow operation. Transport of some kind must be provided for ammunition at least, and even the Chinese soldiers cannot live upon the food they will find.

Meantime it is clear that the Japanese fleet has not been making stupid attacks upon fortified harbors, but has been searching for the Chinese fleet in order to bring it into action. Apparently whilst it was searching for the Chinese fleet at the mouth of the Petcheli gulph a portion of the Chinese fleet was searching for it within the gulph itself. On one occasion at least the Chinese fleet, according to Chinese reports, declined an action. Everything shows that, so far as transport to the chief ports of Korea is concerned, Japan has complete command of the sea. With regard to reports of Japanese landings at Gensan and Fusan, it is to be remembered that these ports are not closed by ice during the winter while Chemulpho is. Therefore if the Japanese, who have become very skillful engineers, could, during the