

the school. If he can not control his feelings, the punishment should be deferred until he can.

3, Punishment should never be inflicted *simply* because the offender deserves it. Ill-desert furnishes a ground for inflicting punishment, but is not in itself a sufficient reason for it. A person under just authority has broken a law. Now we will suppose that the one in authority absolutely knows that that person will never do wrong again, and also that no one in the universe will be influenced, even in the remotest degree or manner, by his sin, or by the fact that it goes unpunished, the infliction of punishment under such circumstances would be so much unnecessary pain. It would do no good. And this shows that ill-desert in itself is not a sufficient reason for punishment.

It may be said that punishment should be inflicted in such a case to sustain the dignity of the law. But the object of sustaining the dignity of the law, is to keep men from doing wrong, and if, as was the case in the supposition, that object is already gained in another way, then no pain need be inflicted. No person, however ill-deserving he may be, should be punished, unless his punishment is going to do some good—that is, unless it is going to operate in some way to prevent wrong-doing in the future.

This brings us to the true reason for inflicting punishment. All the reasons that can be given are summed up in one simple, comprehensive reason that applies to *all* legitimate punishments in *all* governments, viz :—Punishment is inflicted to prevent wrong-doing. It may prevent wrong-doing in the offender only, or in others only, or in him and others also. There are circumstances in which punishment is inflicted solely with reference to its effect upon the offender. Such is the case in a family where there is but one child. There are other circumstances in which punishment is inflicted solely with reference to its effect upon others. Illustrations are found in capital punishment and in eternal punishment. These could not be defended for a moment, if the reformation of the offender were the only object of punishment. It is a great mistake to suppose, as some do, that the reformation of the offender is the only or the principal object of punishment. It is, indeed, true that the relative importance to be attached to the reformation of the

offender increases as the number of subjects diminishes, so that if the number be reduced to one, and that one the offender, his reformation becomes the great object of punishment. But such cases are rare, if they exist at all. The general statement that punishment is intended to prevent wrong-doing covers all cases, even those in which there is no wrong-doing to be prevented except in the offender. While the statement that the object of punishment is the reformation of the offender is only a partial truth, and sometimes is not even that. If the offender can be reformed, so much the better, but if there is absolutely no hope of his reformation, the punishment must still oftentimes be inflicted. It is so in God's government; it is so in the state; it is so in the school.

Punishment operates in two ways to prevent wrong-doing.

*First*, it brings the motive of fear to bear upon the minds of those who are disposed to wrong. This is a proper motive to use with such persons. They must be restrained from doing wrong, if not by a higher motive, then by a lower.

*Secondly*, it gives to all an impressive exhibition of the nature and guilt of wrong-doing, and of the justice and dignity of the law. The person who has a proper idea of these things is not so apt to do wrong, as is the person whose ideas of these things are faint and indistinct.

Now let us make a practical application of those principles to the school. The school is a government in itself. The teacher is the governor. He combines, in most cases, the legislative, judicial, and executive offices. In order to secure that good order and decorum, without which the great object of the school cannot be attained, the teacher lays down certain rules. They are for the public good, for the good of the whole school, and hence for the good of each individual in the school. The fact, however, that it is for their interest to keep the rules, does not induce all to keep them. One of the scholars breaks a rule. If he is not punished he will be encouraged to break it again and again, while others influenced by his example, will do likewise. But if the teacher firmly yet kindly inflicts the punishment, the *fear* of suffering similar pain or disgrace has the *tendency* to prevent the offender and others like him from breaking the rule in future. At the