

position, and I will therefore say, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, that in no sense do I count myself a materialist. I cannot see how such a thing as our consciousness can possibly be *produced* by a nervous machinery, though I can perfectly well see how, if "ideas" do accompany the workings of the machinery, the *order* of the ideas might very well follow exactly the *order* of the machine's operations. Our habitual associations of ideas, trains of thought, and sequences of action might thus be consequences of the succession of currents in our nervous systems. And the possible stock of ideas a man would have to choose from might depend on his native and acquired brain powers exclusively. If this were all, we might indeed adopt the fatalist conception which I sketched for you but a short while ago. Our ideas would be determined by brain currents, and these by mechanical laws exclusively.

But after what we have just seen—namely, the part played by voluntary attention in volition—a belief in free will and purely spiritual causation is still open to us. The duration and amount of this attention *seem* within certain limits indeterminate. We *feel* as if we could make it really more or less, and as if our free action in this regard were a genuine critical point in nature, a point on which our destiny and that of others might hinge. The whole question of free will concentrates itself, then, at this same small point: "Is, or is not, this most natural appearance of indeterminism at this point an illusion?"

It is plain that such a question can be decided only by general analogies, and not by accurate observations. The free-willist believes the appearance to be a reality; the determinist believes that it is an illusion. I myself hold with the free willists; not because I cannot conceive the fatalist theory clearly, or because I fail to understand

its plausibility, but simply because, if free will is true, it would seem absurd to have the belief in it fatally forced on our acceptance. Considering the inner fitness of things, one would rather think that the very first act of a will endowed with freedom should be to sustain the belief in the freedom itself. I accordingly believe in my freedom with the best of scientific consciences, and hope that, whether you follow my example in this respect or not, it will at least make you see that such psychological and psychophysical theories as I hold do not necessarily force a man to become a fatalist or a materialist.

One final word about the will, and I shall conclude both that subject and these lectures.

There are two types of will; there are also two types of inhibition. We may call them inhibition by repression or by negation, and inhibition by substitution, respectively. The difference between them is that, in the case of inhibition by repression, both the inhibited idea and the inhibiting idea, the impulsive idea and the idea that negates it, remain along with each other in consciousness, producing a certain inward strain or tension there; whereas, in inhibition by substitution, the inhibiting idea supersedes altogether the idea which it inhibits, and the latter quickly vanishes from the field.

For instance, your pupils are wandering in mind, are listening to a sound outside the window, which presently grows interesting enough to claim all their attention. You can call the latter back by bellowing at them not to listen to those sounds, but to keep their minds on their books or on what you are saying. And by thus keeping them conscious that your eye is sternly upon them you may produce a good effect. But it will be a wasteful effect and an inferior effect. For the moment you relax your supervision, the