

our nature which are unconscious of. For instance, unless under temptation obey the subjective feeling class tempting them to work; but we think it person is not consciously his blind facility or tendency to do some things so therefore be a certain carefully watched, will facilities in ourselves influenced by habit or by the nature of effort is the same facilities or tendency or evil are scarcely who are habitually in-

two things: (1) to the rough the Latent Constitution, by which we

there is very good reason subjective feelings or that we said on Latent reader, he will have no We say then that the motives acting on the

say that they are just social nature, which fit those things for which or instance, in man's m than to bend them toward; it is easier to s it is in the physical, no constituted that it man that for which he im to speak the truth the same reason it is rightforward than to be ration of these innate

the instincts, conscious oh have been already

gs or motives. called motives at all, bless we call them so, ting insensibly on us d of action must be their being removed be therefore no new selves consciously to

motives or springs of the palm is the force ard is the force that nities; that is, they

moral constitution, things than others.

These tendencies or facilities are natural, because they arise out of the special adaptation of his nature to certain modes of thought and action, for which he was intended. But a facility or tendency that is not strictly natural may be acquired in either of these things. We find by the repeated practice of modes of thought or action, not strictly those for which we may have innate facilities or tendencies, that it is possible, nevertheless, to acquire great facilities and tendencies in them: just as the athlete or gymnast, by the repeated straining of his limbs in peculiar shapes and performances, is able at last to acquire considerable facility in doing so. This acquired facility or tendency is called habit, and it enters largely into all our modes of thought and action. It is both a facility and a tendency, like the unconscious instincts of the second class, giving both facility in doing an act and proneness to doing it, only it differs from them in not being strictly innate, but acquired. Habit will give greater facility and tendency where innate facility and tendency previously exist, and create a certain amount of facility and tendency where none innate may exist previously. Habit extends its power largely over the subjective feelings, as well as over the intellect and the will. As the operations of both the intellect and the will become easier by repetition, so also does the excitement, etc., of the subjective feelings by much exercise; yea, so much so is this the case, that desires and appreciative gratifications, of which heretofore we have almost deemed ourselves incapable, have come to be sensibly felt through its influence. We must, however, beware of imagining that habit can create a subjective feeling. Habit will give facility and tendency in a faculty if it exists, but it never creates a faculty. Habit will give facility in the use of the hand, but it never creates the hand.

In conclusion, then, we may say that habit is the facility in modes of thought or action, or tendencies to them, which the mind acquires by practice; in other words, it is that power of the mind by which it accommodates itself to circumstances and works with facility under them.

Memory.

Memory is that power of the mind by which it is able to retain its conception of things and recall them at pleasure to conscious thought. All our knowledge of things thus stored away in the memory seems to be latently present in our consciousness, even when we are not specially thinking of them; and it seems to be also through this latently conscious power that we are able when we like to recall them to conscious thought; in other words, to bring them out of the shadow into clear light for inspection.

It is doubtful if a conception once lodged in the memory is ever absolutely lost, but the power of recalling it to the attention at pleasure may be lost, of which fact every one's daily experience furnishes ample proof.

This power of recalling conceptions from the memory usually or mainly depends on the following things:—

1. On Habit, the result of repetition, and which gives us facility or tendency in flashing up the desired thought or conception.

2. On the amount of subjective feeling, as excitant or gratificatory, caused by the conception at the time of its first lodgment in the memory.

This is so important an element in things to be remembered that we regard it as the one great essential to easy recollection. Conceptions which generate no subjective feeling of interest, pain, pleasure, etc., are to all minds difficult to recall. For this reason all conceptions involving objects of peculiar combination, character or relations, as contiguity, contrast, opposition, similarity, etc., awaken subjective feelings of interest, etc., and are easily remembered. All such characters and relations as awaken the subjective senses of beauty, admiration, love, fear, hatred, indignation, avarice, pride, approbation or disapproval, condemnation or acquittal, etc., are usually very easy of recollection. The more powerful the subjective feeling which may be caused by the conception at the time of its lodgment in the memory, the more easily is the conception afterwards remembered.

3. On the amount of time which a thing has been before the attention at the time of its lodgment in the memory. For this reason outward physical acts, such as the work or transactions of a day, are generally easily remembered. They are not more transitory conceptions fitting across the mind like a flash of lightning, but, from the circumstances in which they present themselves, are necessarily before the attention for a considerable time.

4. On the intensity of attention given to the thing at the time of its deposition in the memory. For this reason whatever has been observed with laxity of attention is seldom remembered without great effort, and things requiring considerable concentration of thought at the time of their observance are afterwards generally found more easy of recollection.

5. On association with things which from other causes are easily remembered. Things may thus be associated together either in the same conception or in the mind at the same moment by tactual succession.—See article on Tactual Succession of Thought, page 40. All