

The colonialist approach of certain enterprises in Latin America gave fighting ground to communism. The new U.S. administration had accepted new concepts but this had come too late for Cuba. Castro's policies and measures had already been undertaken and he had already come to some extent under Russian influence. The only real solution was to arrive at a position where Castro would be removed to allow the anti-Batista democrats to take over. *Mr. Diefenbaker* agreed but asked how Castro was to be removed. *Mr. Bourguiba* said that if earlier on the United States had given help to the Cuban patriots, it would have been successful. The United States had been too cautious and should have carried through with bolder plans. Obviously the U.S. could not readily accept such a close neighbour under Soviet influence. *Mr. Diefenbaker* asked *Mr. Bourguiba* what he thought should be done now. The *President* said that the U.S. Intelligence people had made serious mistakes. However, Castro was now aggravating the situation, was going to extremes and making many mistakes. Castro's own situation was certainly getting worse. Perhaps in due course another attempt by anti-Castro patriots would be successful. The Soviet Union could not do very much in these circumstances. (Imagine if Rumania or Bulgaria were to carry out a pro-American revolution!) The *President* was convinced that Castro could not last long and suggested that this prediction be remembered.

*Algeria:* The *Prime Minister* invited his visitor's comments on the prospects in Algeria. The *President* said that the situation continued to be difficult but he continued to have some qualified optimism. He thought negotiations would begin on May 4 and that they would bear fruit. But the Algerian war had lasted too long and the situation had become more complicated. There was still the important problem of the Sahara and its oil to be arranged. *Prime Minister Debré* wanted to retain the Sahara for France. The resources of the Sahara were great, particularly in petroleum. Tunisia was also interested in exploiting oil resources in the small area of the Sahara reserved for it. The *Prime Minister* asked for clarification of this reference and enquired if there were any agreement, and between whom, as to disposition of Saharan territory. The *President* replied that there was no international agreement but that Tunisia had justifiable claims to a small area, about 500 by 200 kilometres adjacent to Tunisia. He mentioned that Tunisia already had a pipe-line. He went on to explain that, when France controlled all North Africa, it had carved up territories, established boundaries and, in the process, had arbitrarily allocated the "huge belly" of the Sahara to Algeria. Some logical and beneficial redistribution of this territory was called for. He said that the Maghreb countries, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and, possibly, Libya, had been thinking about plans for a cooperative form of association to develop the Sahara. They hoped to enlist the close cooperation of France in such a project, since the ensemble of North Africa had close ties with France and French technical and financial contributions would be obviously useful. Such an association for development of the Sahara could place on a level of secondary importance the question of sovereignty of the Sahara. The possibilities of including France in such an association and of French cooperation depended on the way the French proceeded with regard to Algeria. France could place psychological obstacles in the way of future cooperation; timing was very important and dilatory tactics by the French in reaching an agreement on Algeria could heighten North African resentments and make effective Saharan arrangement more difficult. The *Prime Minister* asked what form of cooperation with France was envisaged. *Mr. Bourguiba* answered that he envisaged cooperation in entire freedom. It would not be a formalized alliance nor necessarily an institutional agreement. The specific forms were hard to foresee. Emotions must be allowed time to subside and the interests of all must be keyed to cooperation.

*Attitude of North Africa to the West:* *Mr. Diefenbaker* asked about the influence of the communist countries in North Africa. He specifically enquired about the presence and influence of the Chinese communists. *Mr. Bourguiba* said there had been little sign of the