

problems with your colleagues, I also wish you to raise with them the best means of placing this subject before the UNGA. The least controversial approach might be to suggest in the Committee that the 17 states represented at Geneva jointly request the Secretary-General to include a supplementary item on the Agenda on the basis of the two ENDC progress reports. By following this procedure we might also hope to head off submission of separate items by other countries, particularly the Soviet bloc which would probably attempt to slant UNGA discussions in its favour by the description of the item and wording of the accompanying explanatory memorandum.

Tactics at the 17th UNGA

5. You should continue to pursue the line that the only hope of achieving real progress on disarmament lies in ensuring that detailed negotiations are resumed in Geneva at an early date, if possible before November 12. This consideration suggests that Canadian representatives should take an active part in trying to limit propaganda exchanges in the UNGA, and in directing the debate towards providing a clear mandate for the resumed negotiations in the ENDC. Although numerous proposals will probably be discussed at the UNGA (e.g. those mentioned in your reference telegram), our best policy will be to continue trying to concentrate on securing the passage of one major resolution which would take account of suggestions made during the debate and refer any resolutions which may be adopted to the ENDC for detailed consideration. Our telegram No. N-275† gives the text of a draft resolution designed to achieve this purpose which I wish you to discuss with your colleagues when putting forward the above views.

6. While our main effort should still be along the above lines we recognize that in view of the agreement on a recess there is likely to be a full debate on disarmament at the UNGA as in recent years. As a result, it would not be feasible to pursue the policy which we suggested before the recess was agreed, namely, that Western delegates abstain *pro forma* on resolutions affecting Western security, without any commitment on their substance, on the grounds that they involve questions which would be best considered in the ENDC. Instead, it seems probable, as your reference telegram suggests, that we will be obliged to take a stand on a series of resolutions which may be put forward by neutral delegations as well as representatives of the Communist bloc.

7. As you are aware from discussions in NAC, the USA has argued that NATO delegations should agree in advance on the attitude to be adopted toward resolutions involving "nuclear issues," and, where possible, on counter-resolutions which would be supported by the Western Powers. In opposition to this proposal, our NATO representative has taken the stand that NATO-sponsored resolutions or a firm "NATO line" on resolutions submitted by other delegations would be unlikely to command wide support and could be self-defeating in that they would divert attention from the overriding need to resume negotiations in Geneva. I wish you to continue to urge this point in discussions with your Western colleagues. In addition, now that the circumstances in which we had envisaged the possibility of *pro forma* abstentions no longer obtain, you should explain that Canada will have to consider resolutions submitted during the disarmament debate on their merits. You should also remind your colleagues of our long-standing view that the West must be careful to avoid appearing to adopt a consistently negative attitude toward proposals sponsored by the neutrals, especially those which reflect the views of a wide selection of UN members.

8. *For NATO Paris.* In elaborating our position on tactics for the 17th UNGA at the next Council discussion of disarmament, you should base your remarks on the points set out in paragraphs 5-7 above.