

has had therefore considerable time for experiment. It has been found that there are 100 representatives on an average to be elected for the whole state and three in every constituency. The party in minority can always obtain one representative in the constituency. Therefore it cannot be said that there are parts of the state which are not represented by both sides. But on the other hand it does not give proportional representation as one would like to see. It has not resulted either in procuring a very much improved class of candidates, and independent parties have not been able to elect any representatives at all. Of course, where there is cumulative voting, there is the difficulty presented of some powerful candidate getting an undue number of votes from what is called plumping. He receives a larger number of votes than is actually given for those who are running with him on the same side, and therefore it becomes the duty of the party bosses or organizers to remove candidates who would, by receiving a large number of plumpers, do great injury to the party. These candidates are otherwise in every way acceptable, but are considered dangerous and have therefore to be removed, and that is the reason why the system itself has been condemned in many parts of the United States where it has been tried for years. Where the limits of a constituency are very extensive, the system of plumping sometimes produces very remarkable results. Cumulative voting has been resorted to in many parts of the United States for the municipal elections, such as the elections of school trustees, and these elections have produced sometimes very curious results. I have in mind the case of a municipal election for the election of school trustees in the city of Manchester, where there were fifteen candidates and every elector had consequently fifteen votes. Although the city is remarkable for its ardent Protestantism and the strength of its labour element, the man who came out at the head of the poll, with 20,000 votes more than the next candidate, was the Rev. Canon O'Toole, a Catholic priest who, through the system of plumping, had succeeded in distancing all other candidates by a very large majority. That is a result which often occurs where the electoral district is large and there is cumulative voting.

So far I have as briefly as possible explained some of the reforms which are suggested and the demands made to mitigate the undue evils of the present system. It must be generally recognized by all experts who have considered the subject that these systems I have adverted to are a marked improvement on the old one and have in many cases procured the end in view, namely, some degree of proportionate represen-

tations and some voice for the minority, but they do not result in a true and mathematical representation of the opinions of the electors. Therefore, the matter has been studied more deeply by other writers, and I desire to say a few words to the House in regard to what is called strictly proportional representation. The name is an extremely long one, and it is to be hoped that those who are in favour of the system will invent some shorter formula than these two very long words to designate the movement. But, in reality it is a very simple system, and it is designated in shorter words where it has been brought into use on the continent of Europe, in Switzerland, in Denmark and Belgium. The system is advocated in England by a very important league called the Proportional Representation League. That league is composed of some of the most eminent men in England, both in politics—and on both sides—and outside of politics. And, as it states in its programme, it is not absolutely wedded to the single transferable vote. Perhaps the shortest way for me to make known to the House what the system is, is to quote the formula, if I may call it so, of the proportional league on the principles and methods of the society. I take this from 'Representation,' the journal of the society:

Our Aims.

1. To reproduce the opinions of the electors in parliament and other public bodies in their true proportions.
2. To secure that the majority of electors shall rule and all considerable minorities shall be heard.
3. To give electors a wider freedom in the choice of representatives.
4. To give representatives greater independence from the financial and other pressure of small sections of constituents.
5. To ensure to parties representation by their ablest and most trusted members.

Our Methods.

1. Unite existing constituencies into larger ones returning three or more members each, having regard to natural divisions of the country, such as large towns, counties or parts of counties; give each constituency so formed a number of members proportionate to its electorate, the total number of the House of Commons being the same as at present, or smaller.
2. Decide elections by a proportionate system, such as that known as the 'single transferable vote' under which
 - A. Each elector has one vote and one vote only.
 - B. The elector votes.
 - (a) By placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate he likes best. He is also invited to place
 - (b) The figure 2 opposite the name of his second choice.
 - (c) The figure 3 opposite the name of his third choice, and so on, numbering as many candidates as he pleases in the order of his preference.