

I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that hon. members will recall the Canadian Government advocated the holding of such a meeting within the framework of the Security Council; but when it became apparent that further action in the Security Council was no longer possible, having regard to the lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council and the use of the veto by the U.S.S.R., the questions at issue were transferred to the General Assembly and there was called by the U.S.S.R. an emergency special session under the procedures envisaged in the uniting for peace resolution of November 3, 1950.

At that time the Canadian Government took the stand that since a solution of the Middle East questions was still to be pursued within the United Nations framework, we were prepared to support efforts within the General Assembly toward the finding of a solution of those problems.

Without going into detail of the underlying reasons for the transfer of those complaints from the Security Council to the General Assembly, I will simply say that the Soviet Union apparently decided that it might stand to gain by such a change of forum which would afford a better sounding board for propaganda steps; but I would remind the committee that the United States Government had placed before the Security Council a proposal that a meeting of the General Assembly should be held, provided that the discussions and deliberations within the Security Council broke down.

#### Main Statements

There were three main statements of position at the start of the general debate at the emergency session of the General Assembly, and those three statements afford a background for what happened in the next 10 days. The first statement was made by the Secretary-General on August 8, and I would interpolate here that by that statement on August 8 at the so-called pro forma meeting of the General Assembly the Secretary-General indeed set the tone for a constructive debate. He outlined on that occasion what he termed some of the basic needs for action in the region of the Middle East and suggested the desirability of finding a formula by which the affairs of the states of the region could be looked at very carefully and whereby they could take a more positive attitude with respect to the affairs of their neighbours.

Second, in that introductory statement he emphasized the need of finding a formula to permit a United Nations solution to the problems of Lebanon and Jordan. Third, he held forth on the need for a co-operative approach to the economic problems of the Arab Middle East. While he made no specific proposals, he succeeded on that occasion in drawing the attention of the 80 nations represented in the General Assembly to the important truth that the key to the problems of the region rests largely in the hands of the states of the area themselves.