

attitudes toward this matter we would not have been of any help to our friends subsequently, nor would we have been able to play the part which we at least tried to play and which I shall refer to later.

If, for instance, we had voted at the first meeting of the special Assembly against the proposal to put this item on the agenda when no other member of the Assembly voted against it except the United Kingdom and France I think we would have lost any influence which we had at that time and which we may have hoped to use later on for constructive purposes.

Our purpose was to be as helpful to the United Kingdom and France as we possibly could be. Believe me, that attitude has been appreciated in London even if it has not been appreciated by my hon. friends opposite. Far from criticizing us in private or in public in London or Paris for our gratuitous condemnation of their course we have had many expressions of appreciation for the line we have been trying to follow, and which has been helpful in the circumstances to the United Kingdom and France.

#### Sequence of Events in the General Assembly

The sequence of events at the Assembly and our relation to those events will show what we tried to do, and why. I should like to give that sequence, if I may, because I feel it will be useful to the House to know exactly what happened and the attitude we took in regard to every stage of development at the Assembly.

We met on Thursday, November 1, in the first emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution which had been passed in 1950 and which was designed to get around the veto in the Security Council by transferring to the Assembly matters on which the Security Council could not agree because of the veto. When this Assembly was called and this item was put on the agenda it was objected to on legal grounds by the United Kingdom and France, legal grounds which we did not think had very much validity and so we voted for the Assembly meeting.

That was the occasion on which we were attacked by my hon. friend as lining up with the Russians. We lined up with 62 members of the United Nations in agreeing to the proposition that the United Nations should try to deal with this matter. Immediately after that resolution the United States, without very much consultation or very much opportunity for consideration, introduced the cease-fire resolution.

We felt, as I have already said, that this had two defects. Of course it was designed to bring the fighting to an end at once and it was designed to prevent military aid going to either side in the conflict. It was designed, in one of its clauses, to restore freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal for all governments. These purposes we, of course, supported; but we felt that there had not been sufficient time for consideration to force a vote through before others who wished to speak could