

fact but claimed that the interval was inevitable and would be short. This is the "simultaneity" of prohibition and control as envisaged by the Soviet Union. It is true that Mr. Vyshinsky later suggested in the Political Committee that a compromise might be to proclaim prohibition in principle immediately and at the same time to state that it would become effective only when international control was established. This revised Soviet proposal was referred for further study to the new Disarmament Commission but there the Soviet Representative has so far refused to discuss this point in detail until the Commission first decides on prohibition.

The sub-committee having reported back to the Political Committee, the Western powers submitted a revised text of their proposals which attempted to go some way to meet Soviet criticisms. The Soviet Delegation merely submitted its original counter-proposals again. However, these proposals and other amendments by Czechoslovakia and Egypt along similar lines were decisively defeated in the Committee. The tripartite resolution as a whole was then adopted in the Committee by 44 votes (including Canada) to 5 (the Soviet bloc) with 10 abstentions (Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Yemen) and in the Assembly itself by a similar vote. The text of the final resolution is contained in Appendix 5.

The Disarmament Commission thus established commenced its work in March of this year in New York, where it has since been meeting periodically. Having agreed to follow the rules of procedure of the former Atomic Energy Commission, it embarked on a long discussion of its programme of work. The Soviet Representative insisted that the Commission should first decide in principle that all weapons of mass destruction should be outlawed and that conventional armaments should be reduced by a given percentage (perhaps one-third) of current levels. He persisted in presenting this issue solely in terms of the Soviet proposals made at the recent session of the Assembly, in spite of the fact that these proposals had in no sense been referred to the Commission for further examination. The Western delegations, while not objecting to examination of the Soviet proposals, maintained that they would be meaningless unless the Commission were at the same time to agree upon methods for putting them into effect, on which the Soviet proposals were deplorably imprecise.

Finally, an agreement was reached for a programme of work calling for simultaneous examination of the question of the regulation of all armaments and armed forces and the question of their disclosure and verification. Two working committees were set up, Committee One to deal with the first of these questions, and Committee Two to deal with the second. The membership of these Committees was to be the same as for the Commission itself and they were to function simultaneously.

It cannot be said that the Commission or its Committees have made any substantial progress up to the time of writing. This is partly because the Soviet Representative has confined himself to criticising the proposals of other members of the Commission and has declined to submit alternative suggestions. Another reason is that the Soviet Representative, by repeatedly alleging that United Nations forces in Korea are waging bacteriological warfare, has distracted the Commission from its proper functions. These charges, which have been much exploited by the communist press, were denied categorically by the United States Representative and were also refuted by the spokesmen of