

Many options have been proposed in order to improve the effectiveness of the UN in implementing and enforcing Security Council decisions, and the effectiveness of regions and regional institutions in response to security problems and crises in their backyard. The singular success of the United States in forming a politically viable multinational force during the Gulf War led to proposals that the UN should 'contract out' major military operations to multi-national coalitions or regional organizations. For its part, in 1992 NATO formulated a broad 'inter-locking institutions' concept for European security. These proposals have informed much of the discussion on regional organizations at the UN and in Western capitals; and to some extent they have also percolated down to some regional institutions, notably the OAU.

Debate on such ideas, however, as been so far inconclusive. There is now a much better understanding of the practical and political problems associated with the subcontractant option and certainly a much more acute appreciation of the fact that institutional development is a necessary but insufficient condition to more effective regional crisis management. High amongst the outstanding difficulties is the basic fact that most regional organizations do not have the financial resources or the political-military machinery to put together, command and control even small peacekeeping contingents for a significant period of time, let alone more heavily armed formations.<sup>14</sup> In that respect the ECOMOG mission in Liberia should be seen more as an exception than a clear indication of future trends in the developing world.

Of existing regional structures, only NATO, and to a marginal extent the Western European Union (WEU) - both of which are *not* Chap. VIII organizations - have the military potential and organization to play a significant and effective role in peacekeeping and/or enforcement in support of the UN or the OSCE.<sup>15</sup> Events in the Former Yugoslavia have

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<sup>14</sup> This is not to say that Chapter VIII organizations have no experience of peacekeeping or peace observation. The Arab League, with its Arab Security Force in Kuwait (1961-1963), was the first regional organization to mount a regional peacekeeping operation. The OAS and the OAU were both also involved in a limited number of small-scale operations during the Cold War. On the whole, however, the peacekeeping experience of the regional during the Cold War demonstrated that they could not sustain operations for very long nor did they always follow core UN peacekeeping principles (i.e. impartiality, consent and non-use of force).

<sup>15</sup> It should be pointed out here that at the Helsinki Summit of July 1992, CSCE - now OSCE - members created a permanent Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and approved measures empowering the OSCE to actively take on conflict prevention tasks. As for peacekeeping tasks, the original concept was that NATO or the WEU would fulfil peacekeeping mandates negotiated under the aegis of the OSCE. In the case of the latter activity it seems the situation is evolving in a different manner than expected. Under an OSCE military advisory group called the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) the OSCE is now in the final planning stages