Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime should focus only on controlling fissile material, not on the associated technologies require to build, test and deliver nuclear weapons.

The second argument is that conventional arms acquisitions consume more resources in the developing world than programs for weapons of mass destruction. Estimates are vague, but vastly more resources are devoted to building and maintaining conventional arsenals than to programs for weapons of mass destruction, especially in the developing world. Further, the Iraqi experience also demonstrates that a state has to be extremely wealthy, or extremely dedicated (or both), in order to advance very far towards building weapons of mass destruction.[36] This sort of effort can only be duplicated by a handful of states, and although the states in question are a major source of international concern (especially North Korea, Iran and Pakistan), the bulk of the conflicts and wars in the developing world in the next few years will almost certainly involve states that have nothing but conventional weapons.

In addition, it is also possible that measures to control weapons of mass destruction increase the desire of states to obtain sophisticated conventional weapons, creating a "balloon syndrome" whereby restraint in one area merely compels a bulge in another. The active chemical weapons programs of between 10 and 25 states in the early 1990s provide evidence for this: chemical weapons have proven attractive to many states in the developing world *not* because they are militarily useful or cost-efficient, but because they are "second-best" terror weapons, especially in light of the NPT regime.[37] Hence efforts to control weapons of mass destruction may paradoxically increase the threats faced by many states unless attention is paid to the conventional side of the arms dynamic.

This observation is closely connected with the fourth and fifth points: the "military technological revolution" is blurring the line of destructiveness between conventional and unconventional weapons, especially in regional conflicts, so as to make the distinction meaningless. The emergence of a highly-sophisticated "reconnaissance strike complex," points the way to a revolution in the destructiveness of armaments and warfare that makes the term "conventional" extremely misleading. Mass air-delivery fuel-air explosives, for example, "can cover an area over 1,000 feet long with blast pressures five times that of TNT...[that] mimics small nuclear explosions." Whether one focuses on accuracy, range, rates

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[36] For details on the Iraqi weapons program see David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Nuclear Hide-and-Seek," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 1991), 14-23; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Bomb: Blueprints and Artifacts," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1992), 30-40.

[37] In 1992 the Director of the CIA testified that 20 countries are suspected of having or developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; a British Ministry of Defence White Paper also alleged that 20 states had chemical weapons programs. Various estimates of the number of states with chemical weapons programs are offered in SIPRI, *1990 Yearbook*, 111-2; SIPRI, *1993 Yearbook*, 268.