

What is meant by the term "verification regime" and does the term "regime" have any special meaning in this application? Is a regime more than just a collection of similar measures or requirements? What are the implications associated with a complex regime concept? These questions flow from the existence and continued utility of the formal regime concept employed in international relations theory.

What is the most effective and useful way of ascertaining what arms control efforts are likely to be undertaken in the future and what types of verification approaches might function with them best? This is a question about the conduct of futures research, with a special focus on verification. Are potentially useful but unorthodox or unusual approaches and techniques for verification likely to be missed because "futures thinking" is too conservative, inflexible or limited? How important a role should this type of futures thinking play in decisions about research and more current policy?

Verification and the Confidence-building Process

What is the relationship between the confidence-building process and the verification process and how can they help (or hinder) each other? How do they interact — or, more accurately, how do different types of CBM interact with the verification process? Does the fact that both involve poorly appreciated psychological processes make their interaction even more difficult to understand and more difficult to predict? Do important trade-offs exist in the pursuit of these two activities? How can they be resolved?

Does the verification of an arms control agreement differ appreciably compared with the verification of a confidence-building agreement? Is the concern with psychology and decision-maker perception sufficiently dominant in the confidence-building process that verification efforts must be muted in order to preserve or enhance the confidence-building effect?

What are the possible relationships between confidence-building and agreements for arms limitation? What (if any) are the synergistic relationships among various arms control and confidence-building agreements (existing and possible), and their verification regimes? The CFE and the CDE are good illustrations of this potential interaction and synergy. Would other possible combinations of arms control and confidence-building agreements demonstrate the same effect? Could agreements be designed to maximize this overlap and synergy in verification regimes?

New Approaches for the Verification Process

To what extent can ideas developed for the verification of bilateral strategic nuclear agreements be used for the verification of multilateral arms control and confidence-building agreements? Are there likely to be unanticipated negative consequences due to their origins, and to the original subjects associated with their adoption?

How much scope is there for the development of "facilitating measures," various measures intended to make the verification of arms control agreements easier? (This category includes such measures as information exchanges, co-operative measures to make remote monitoring either easier or possible, voluntary invitations to inspect and observe activities of potential concern, etc.) How broad can this category be and what new measures might be added to it? What types will be most useful in various possible arms control and confidence-building agreements?

Are there ways of designing inspection regimes (ground and aerial) so that the probability of detecting undeclared, non-compliant activities is enhanced without increasing the number or intrusiveness of the inspections? Should a certain fraction of inspections be conducted on a selective, random basis within broad areas more likely to contain examples of non-compliant activity? To what extent ought inspection regimes to employ randomness? What statistical and other analytic techniques (including game theory) might assist in the design of such regimes?

