

issues. Unwilling to make the political compromises necessary to attract support from gray areas within capitalist society and in the Third World as well, the exponents of a two-camp foreign policy evidently prefer to maintain a sense of dedication to a sacred revolutionary mission. Operationally, these attitudes are expressed in strident slogans that emphasize a very energetic defense effort, sustained political vigilance, and the exposure of imperialism, particularly American and West German imperialism, to the peoples of the world. In conducting this political trench warfare, no deviation is to be tolerated in Eastern Europe.⁶ Moscow is to have little or nothing to do with Western governments, for fraternization of any kind only serves to blur the fundamental distinctions that exist between socialism and capitalism at every point. In no way should the Soviet Union become dependent upon Western behaviour for its own security. Taken as a whole, these views on foreign policy are sectarian in that if implemented they would entail a self-isolation of the Soviet regime, masked by the triumphalist revolutionary propaganda of a militant political sect. Western observers frequently err in reading this as a prescription for an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. In reality it represents a passive acceptance of a hostile international status quo. As such it appears to be calculated in part to retrieve and justify the practices and priorities of Soviet internal politics during the Stalin era. As such it also