

again reminiscent of the SALT agreements, requires that the parties not interfere with legitimate national technical means. However, attention has inevitably centred on the innovating provisions of the treaty which provide for on-site verification. In order to ensure that the destruction of INF missiles is carried out in accordance with the detailed provisions of the treaty, the parties agreed for the first time to on-site inspection. These inspections gave both sides the right to visit operating locations to confirm the data provided in the Memorandum of Understanding, to confirm the elimination of missiles and launchers in accordance with the agreed schedule, and to initiate a number of short-notice, challenge inspections of operating locations for a further period of thirteen years to confirm that INF missiles had not been reintroduced.

Finally, the treaty provided for a strictly limited form of perimeter factory monitoring. The United States is entitled to monitor the Votkinsk factory which produces stages for both the SS-20 and the SS-25 (a mobile ICBM not covered by the treaty). The Soviet Union is entitled to monitor the Magna, Utah, plant which once made boosters for the Pershing II, and more recently produces components for the MX and Trident missiles.

Implications of INF Verification

Until March 1987 Soviet policy on verification, particularly on-site inspection, had been cautious. On the other hand, the Reagan administration took an aggressive approach, calling for 'effective' rather than simply 'adequate' measures of verification. In the words of Caspar Weinberger, this meant that an INF Treaty would require "... the ability to do what bank inspectors do."

The United States backed away from highly intrusive factory monitoring once it became clear that the Soviets were prepared to meet this demand. The response of private industry, of the Congress and NATO allies was skeptical if not hostile to the prospect that Soviet inspectors might have free rein in the inspection of weapons producing factories. As well, the United States probably misjudged the ability of the Soviets to respond positively to the demand for a high degree of intrusiveness.

The INF Treaty, therefore, has changed the verification issue, but it is not yet clear what the consequences will be for the START negotiations or for other, non-nuclear negotiations such as chemical weapons and conventional forces.

THE START NEGOTIATIONS

By the summer of 1987 the outlines of an agreement to reduce strategic nuclear forces — those with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometres — were already evident. On 8 May 1987 the United States presented a draft START treaty at Geneva which in turn reflected some of the basic areas of agreement reached by the negotiators before the Reykjavik summit. Less than three months later, on

GLOSSARY

ALCM	—	Air-launched cruise missile
GLCM	—	Ground-launched cruise missile
INF	—	Intermediate-range nuclear forces
SLBM	—	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SRAM	—	Short-range attack missile
SRINF	—	Shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces

31 July, the Soviets responded with their own draft treaty which, while differing on certain key issues, nevertheless reflected a broad area of consensus. During the fall of 1987 negotiations intensified, and at the December meeting to sign the INF Treaty the two leaders issued a communiqué on the agreements reached in principle in the START negotiations.

The communiqué instructed the negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of a START treaty, preferably to be ready for signature at the next summit meeting in the first half of 1988. Noting that the negotiators had been able to develop a joint draft treaty text identifying points of both agreement and disagreement, the communiqué listed the agreed framework, viz:

- ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems
- no more than 6,000 warheads on these 1,600 delivery systems
- a sub-limit of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total
- a sub-limit of 154 "heavy" missiles to carry not more than 1,540 warheads
- a limit on the total throw-weight of these delivery vehicles such that, after the prescribed reductions, the aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs will be approximately 50 percent less than current Soviet levels, with the new limit not to be exceeded by either side thereafter.

These ceilings marked steady progress by the negotiators in the period preceding the December summit. For example, the two sides had differed significantly on ballistic missile warhead sub-limits. The United States had wanted a limit of 4,800, with a further sub-limit of 3,300 on ICBMs, thus seriously constraining the largest element of Soviet strategic forces. The Soviets had not agreed to any specific sub-limits on ballistic missiles, and consistently resisted a further sub-limit on ICBMs, threatening to counter with a sub-limit on SLBMs which would have been unacceptable to the United States. The sub-limit of 4,900, therefore, was an important concession by the Soviets, as was their agreement that the throw-weight limit should be entrenched in the treaty itself.