J132(A84)

Proposal Abstract J132(A84)

1. Arms Control Problem:

Nuclear weapons - research and development

- ballistic missiles
 - cruise missiles
 - proliferation
 - comprehensive test ban
 - fissionable material "cutoff"
 - nuclear freeze

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Remote sensors
- (b) On-site inspection selective
 - challenge
 - IAEA safeguards
- (c) International exchange of information declarations
- (d) Seismic sensors intra-border stations

3. Source:

Scoville, Herbert. "First Steps Toward a Freeze". In <u>The Nuclear Weapons Freeze and Arms Control</u>, pp. 75-80. Edited by Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984.

4. Summary:

Scoville suggests that American intelligence capabilities and cooperative measures could provide "quite acceptable verification that the Soviets were not violating a freeze ... to the extent that our security would be significantly affected" (p.77). A freeze on selected programs should include the testing, production and deployment of the systems, although all these phases may not be equally important or verifiable.

The first priority in a freeze should be given to destabilizing strategic weapons systems which have a first strike potential against the other country's deterrent force or its political and military command and control structure. These systems include: Soviet SS-18s and SS-19s (which could be modernized), SS-20s and the recently reported new Soviet ICBMs (SS-Xs); and the American Minuteman IIIs (which could be modernized) and MX program (which should be halted). The SALT II agreement already provides for verification of the testing and deployment phases of these programs and "this should be even easier for a freeze where the programs would be totally halted" (p.76). Monitoring the modernization of SS-18s and SS-19s and Minuteman III could pose a problem since testing of improved guidance systems has almost been completed, but Scoville notes that "the administration has been reporting regularly on the status of such modernization programs so that any significant change of the status of these programs if the testing, production and deployment were all halted completely should be verifiable with an acceptable risk to our security" (p.76-77).