

After the action the regiment was reorganized on the ordinary establishment and did not see foreign service till 1840, when it was sent to the Cape of Good Hope.

The Ninth Lancers were originally raised by the late Sir WATKINS WILLIAMS WYNNE, of Wynnestay, in 1797,—it was then known as the *Ancient Britons*, being principally recruited in Denbigh and Carnarvonshire. It first saw service in the Irish insurrection of 1798, and was reorganized subsequently as Light Cavalry by the Earl of ROSSLYN. Hard fighters as the Welsh always have been, the *Ancient Britons* left a name after them in Wexford, Wicklow, and Carlow which rendered it impossible for the Ninth Lancers to recruit in those Counties for many years after the close of that rebellion. The corps suffered fearfully and were almost annihilated.

A slight historical sketch of each Regiment would be both instructive and valuable—especially as the *British Army*, as a distinctive force, has passed away—and its successor has yet to make history. Connected with the *Black Horse* a story is told which illustrates the mode of organizing an army in the reign of GEORGE THE SECOND :

In the summer of 1741 the regiment was ordered for foreign service; being on the Irish establishment most of the troopers were at their private residences, the horses at grass; they were, however, mustered and embarked for England and reviewed between two English cavalry regiments on Hounslow Heath by the King—the horses of course were in bad condition, and as the clothing was in the last months of wear the men looked shabby—but GEORGE II., who, by the way, bore the name of the "little corporal" forty years before NAPOLEON was born, and who was a thorough soldier, was pleased with the bearing and physique of the troopers, he remarked to the Colonel "Your men are fine fellows and will make good soldiers, but your horses are very bad, how is it?" The answer was "Please your Majesty the men are Irish, and gentlemen, the horses are English." The records of almost every regiment are fruitful with incidents which demonstrate the peculiar circumstances under which the organization of the late British Army grew up, and we respectfully differ from the opinion our contemporary holds, as to the actual value of Mr. CARDWELL's destruction.

The original conception of the British Army was outside the idea of a *Constitutional force* in the sense that the Commons of England should control it, the object was altogether foreign service, and it grew out of the policy of the greatest Statesman that ever wielded the destinies of England and to whose prescience all her wonderful pre-eminence is due—WILLIAM OF ORANGE—the third of that name who sat on her throne—and who always maintained that England's security lay in preserving the balance of power in Europe—for this purpose fighting the battles which would otherwise be con-

tested in the fields of Sussex and Kent on the plains of Flanders.

The force necessary to do this in his day was necessarily, apart from the force whose peculiar duty it was to defend their own homes and hearths, and the lapse of one hundred and eighty five years has not changed the conditions of the proposition. With an army actively engaged in preserving the balance of power England knew no panics affecting her credit, made no disgraceful concessions from fear, her hand and her vigor was felt over the whole world, and her commercial as well as naval supremacy followed as a matter of course.

It remained for the Whig Radicals and Manchester Quakers to disband and break up a force that whatever its faults, has made the whole history of the British Empire as well as built up that structure itself—will its successor with merely home training and officered by school boys without family or name effect as much? Or will it not re-enact the role of the *Preatorian Guards* of the lower Roman Empire?

As long as Commissions in the Army were confined to a class whose claims to the distinction were based on family name, wealth, or distinction, so long there was a close and intimate tie between the aristocracy and working class—the honor and interest of the officer was a pledge for the subordination and obedience to the law of the soldier. Now what is it? The officers have no necessary connection with the wealth or aristocracy of the country—they are underpaid—the rank and file are in the same condition—they are packed together at the Brigade centres, and as they have arms in their hands would not a community of interests make it easy to take toll of the superabundant wealth of Friend JOHN BRIGHT's co-religionists and monopolists? With all local influences about them will it be possible to keep troops so situated under discipline? Will they not be open to all the evils of strikes? Was it not almost by a miracle that London with its three and a half millions of inhabitants was not deprived of its organized protection? Men as well disciplined and better paid than the troops of the line within the past year—through the example set by the success of those strikes—what has happened there may happen at the Brigade centres any day, and then Mr. GLADSTONE's violation of the Constitution and CARDWELL's prescience will receive a proper justification.

The following is the latest account of the further trial of the *Lay Torpedo*; it is taken from the *United States Army and Navy Journal* of 29th March:

To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal,

"SIR.—In your issue of March 22, I find an article containing certain opinions in regard to the *Lay Torpedo*, which are said to have been given to a reporter by me. As I am not ambitious to have my name appear in the torpedo controversy, will you oblige me by publishing the following?

In reply to a courteous inquiry from a stranger on the street, I stated certain opinions of *my own* in relation to the performances of the *Lay torpedo*. I was not at that time a member of the board to witness its trial, nor did I know the opinion of the board in regard to it.

I expressed no idea as to whether the torpedo would be accepted by government or not, and gave no authority for my opinions to appear in print.

Respectfully Yours,

R. B. BRADFORD,

Lieutenant U. S. Navy.

U. S. Torpedo Station, Newport, R. I., March 24th.

(From the Newport Mercury, March 15.)

A Board composed of Lieutenant Commanders Robeson, Manley, and Davis, convened by order of the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance at the Torpedo Station, on the 8th inst. for the purpose of witnessing a further trial of the "*Lay*," torpedo boat. The weather was most favourable for the trial being mild and springlike, the wind was fresh from the southwest, and the atmosphere somewhat hazy, but not enough so as to interfere with the experiment. The boat had been shifted from the ways at the north end of the island, (from which very unsuccessful attempts at launching have recently been made) to a small marine railway further south and nearly astern of the *Nina*. At 3 p. m. the launch was successfully made and the boat started on her journey in a north east direction to a stake boat moored one (1) mile distant. The run was successfully made to the stake boat, the torpedo steering well, time of run to stake boat 12 minutes. At this time, when it seemed as if fortune was about to smile on Mr. Lay, the tables turned, the boat would not, all control of her seeming to have been lost, and soon after passing the stake boat she beached herself. The reason of the failure, if such it can be called, is, we understand, attributable to one of two causes. defective electrical apparatus and wire, or a faulty valve which supplies gas to the steering apparatus. The general impression of those who should know, is, that with another chance and a thorough adjustment of the machinery, battery, etc., and a new set of wires, the *Lay torpedo* will do all that the inventor promises. Another trial will be made at an early day.

Each succeeding trial will verify the conclusions we have arrived at respecting the worthlessness of the machine for offensive or defensive operations.

In our issue of the 8th inst., our Montreal correspondent B. has inadvertently committed the indiscretion of writing on matters connected with the "*Prince of Wales Rifles*," which should be properly kept within the corps. It also appears that the name of the gallant Colonel commanding was used in connection therewith in a manner not warranted by the actual facts of the case.

In this issue is published the Prospectus, Charter, and By-Laws of the National Rifle Association of the State of New York, for the information of our Military friends. We have to thank Capt. DAVIS of the 6th Batt. for this and other documents.