

sole judges of the advisability of such payment, and of the signification of the term "advancement in life." After the share of one of the children had become vested the trustees at her request advanced £250, she being then married, and her husband heavily indebted to one of the trustees of the will, and the moneys so advanced were handed to him and used by him to pay his debt to the trustee, all of which was done with the knowledge of the trustees. The action was brought by the infant children of the married woman, who were entitled in remainder to the fund on the mother's death, she being still living. The case was tried before Kennedy, J., who held that the pretended exercise of the power was not made in good faith for the advancement in life of the daughter of the testator, but really to enable her to provide her husband with money to pay his debt to the trustee, and was therefore invalid, and the payment made thereunder a breach of trust. He also intimated a strong opinion that after the daughter's interest became vested there was no power to make the advancement at all, as her share then had ceased to be "presumptive."

**CERTIORARI—MANDAMUS—PRACTICE.**

*The Queen v. Bowman* (1898) 1 Q.B. 663, was an application for a certiorari to bring up a license to sell liquor, granted by justices, to be quashed; and also for a mandamus to compel them to hear and determine the application for license according to law. The justices had granted the license in question upon the applicant therefor paying to them a sum of money, which they intended to apply towards the reduction of rates, or some other similar public purpose. The present applicants had appeared before the justices to oppose the application for the license. The Court (Wills and Darling, JJ.), held that the granting of the license was not a judicial act, and therefore not quashable, and the certiorari was therefore refused in deference to the case of *Reg. v. Sharman* (1898) 1 Q.B. 578, concerning which Wills, J., however, expresses some doubt. The Court, however, held that the act of the justices in taking money for the granting of the license, though they had acted