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ed by the counter not "reestablish order", it actually increased the disorder in Algeria. The principle of colective responsibility strengthened the solidarity between the people and the FLN. The terrorism of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) did not succeed in changing the policy of the Government in Paris but rather strengthened the latter's desire to get out of the Algerian hornet's nest and hastened the exodus of the European population.

The escalation of violence or the provocation of retaliatory terrorism is one of the risks inherent in any terrorist strategy, but this is not always inevitable. The IRA combings gave rise to counter-terrorism oy underground Protestant organizations, but individual attacks on British soldiers did not produce a terrorist reaction (the massacre of January 30, 1972, in Londonderry was an isolated event). The terrorist ctivities of the Palestinians in Israel and elsewhere prompted terrorist bombings of he refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria, but so far they have not produced a terorist reaction by the Israeli authorities or population against the Arab people in the occupied territories. One of the objects of the Palestinian leaders is doubtless to provoke such a reaction; evidently they ail to realize what this would mean for the Arab "hostages" in Israeli prisons and the people living on the West Bank of the Jordan.

Oldest form

Repressive terrorism is older than the other wo forms; it has a place in history and is till the most important form because of ts consequences. In addition, it is certainy the form that is most often effective. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, it is much easier to use violence to obtain a negative result — that is, as a reventive mechanism for maintaining the tatus quo – than to obtain a positive esult. In the second place, there was for long time a serious imbalance between he organizational ability of governments and that of subject populations. The latter vere powerless to resist repressive terrorsm because they could not organize themelves. The development of revolutions, ^{esist}ance movements and "peoples' wars" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries vas largely the result of political and rganizational factors rather than techical factors. The difference between the ^{veapons} of the regular armies in the eightenth century and those easily available ^{0 the} peasants of that period was much ess significant than that which existed in ^{lietnam} between the American Army and the Viet Cong.

But repressive terrorism is not in itself an international problem. Whether we like it or not, violence by states is tolerated by the international system provided it is kept within national borders. England and France did not declare war on Hitler because he was persecuting the Jews but because he had invaded Poland. It was not Pakistan's brutal repression in Bengal that led to India's involvement in the war; it was rather the problem created by the influx of refugees into its own territory and the opportunity to weaken an adversary decisively.

Inter-state terrorism is, by definition, an international problem. The nuclear "balance of terror" makes it the most serious threat facing the world today. And we should not rule out the possibility – at least as a hypothesis — that the contradiction that exists for some countries between their verbal condemnation of terrorism and their adoption of the latter as the ultima ratio of their foreign policy is one of the reasons for their inability to control insurrectional terrorism. In the last few years, this has increasingly become an international problem — partly, though not exclusively, because of the Middle East conflict. These two forms of terrorism are more recent, in historical terms, than repressive terrorism, and their development has been linked with the transformation of Western political societies that followed the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.

Terrorism and democracy

The development of terrorism is linked with the development of democracy. Instilling fear into an adversary the better to impose one's will on him has always been one of the tactics of war or political combat. But, in societies in which the legitimacy of political power was not based on popular support, the only possible targets for interstate or insurrectional terrorism were the leaders themselves. A strategy of placing bombs indiscriminately in Paris in the seventeenth century to put pressure on Louis XIV would have been meaningless. Similarly, Russian terrorists in the nineteenth century directed their attacks at the Czars and their agents of repression, not at the Russian people as a whole. On the other hand, civilian populations become potential objectives for war or insurrectional activities once the leaders have come to rely on their support - at least in theory and at least in part - to stay in power.

The development of terrorism is also linked with the growth of industrialization, which has increased the state's economic role and its dependence on economic

State violence tolerated in international system

Development of terrorism outgrowth of democracy