deter them from coming that Way again. Our Navy Directors feem to have acted the fame Part. to have imitated that bullying Hero; for, as we had not any important Naval Enemy to contend with, a Genius that Way will be at a Loss to guess why we fitted out so many large Ships; which employed fo many of our Seamen, and proved of so little Use in the respective Stations affigned them, except in regard to what happened near Home, and that principally performed by those not in the grand Secret. In the Mediterranean, it has been observed before, and but too well known, what our Grand Fleet did when an Enemy appeared; and when all Fears of that Kind diffine their Use was evident, in that they were in no Sense able to hinder Supplies from getting into Genoa, though fometimes tumbling in amought whole Fleets of the Enemy. The Reason is owing to our having many great Ships of no Use, and but sew small ones that could only be ferviceable; by which Means the Enemy's straggling Transports easily avoided any fingular Injury; as the taking of ten or twenty out of an hundred, in no Sense answered the Intent of fo extraordinary an Expence, though it expressed, in a very glaring Light, the Want both of Judgment and Occonomy in our Mrnagers; our great End being, if we meant any Thing, to guard the Coast of our Allies, and prevent their Adversaries being supplied; which thirty finall Vessels, with fifty Men each, covered by leven Line of Battle Ships, would have more effectually answered, than Half the capital

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