

the Colonial and Maritime Interests of Great Britain, if, AT THE END OF IT, the British Ministry shall avoid the gross errors into which preceding administrations have fallen ; if they shall rectify the palpable mistakes of negotiators and agents employed to accommodate former disputes with America ; and give to the new treaty of amity which they must enter into with the United States, a character of plainness, decision, and intelligible simplicity, which all the dexterity of American chicanery, shall in vain seek to elude. The war may, under this consideration, be said to have retrieved our lost ground, and to have placed the assertion of our Maritime Rights totally within our power, *unshackled by the embarrassment of improvident concessions, or of commercial treaties.* All past blunders on our part, have been abrogated by the warlike genius of PRESIDENT MADISON : every thing is to begin anew ; and it is to be hoped, that it will begin in a manner that shall ensure the continuance of the system we may adopt in our future relations with the United States.

Among the many topics of grievance which we have enumerated in our summary of the conduct of the American Government, there is one of the very first importance, which we have not yet touched upon ; but which well deserves the serious attention of our Government. For, it has been ever since the treaty of 1783, a perpetual source of bickering between the two countries, and a forcible stimulus to the encroaching spirit of the Americans. We mean, the culpable indifference, not to say ignorance, betrayed by former administrations or their agents, in the arrangement of *the line of boundaries* between the British and American possessions. It will be in our power, AT THE CLOSE of the present hostilities, to repair these extraordinary oversights in the treaty of 1783, and therefore, we feel it to be our duty to expatiate more particularly upon them, in the present article.

It is scarcely credible, though it is the fact, that, in acceding to the independence of the United States, we not only secured to them *their own* territory, but we also ceded to them an extent of country, then a portion of the province of Quebec, nearly of equal magnitude to the whole United States, although not a foot of the country which was thus ceded, was, at the time, occupied by an American in arms, nor could it have been occupied by the Americans had the war continued. This cession is the more remarkable, as New York and Rhode Island were then in the possession of the British army ; whence it was to be inferred, that the surrender of these valuable places would have required a large equivalent in territory elsewhere