

inability to aid these people in the dimensions required is an indictment we must accept. But, sadly, we must also accept that the economic expectations many held for the world in 1961, and for the industrialized countries in particular, were exaggerated. Were these years of unprecedented boom an aberration? Do we need to live now with diminished expectations for growth in the future? If so, it is our obligation to find ways to deal with world problems within the limits of a more stringent environment now than in 1961 and to redouble our efforts, with discipline and dedication, to direct our attentions to where they are really vitally needed.

Interdependence and its relationship to self-determination is a global political, as well as economic, reality. We are all neighbours, and strategically so. Twenty years ago, the East-West strategic focus was mainly on Europe. Today, the risk of confrontation between the superpowers in areas normally considered to be part of the Third World is also enhanced. There is a risk of aggravating problems already anguishing enough in terms of the turbulence and fragility of the conditions of underdevelopment and conflict indigenous to the regions in question. I call for a look backward to those contemporaries of Hammarskjold who saw in non-alignment an opportunity for developing countries to concentrate on the problems before them without the threat of interference in their affairs from more powerful countries intent on subverting their assets to their own purposes. I say that true non-alignment is not only consistent with interdependence, but more necessary because of it.

Is it possible that in the last 20 years the nature of East-West tension has changed because the Soviet Union is today a military superpower with a capability of intervention which ranges far and wide? This capability can constitute a threat to world peace as well as to the non-alignment of countries as long as it is the instrument -- in Afghanistan, as well as in Kampuchea -- of cynical realpolitik. Let us recognize that if the strategic interests of great powers are now in fact interdependent with events in the Third World, then it calls above all for great restraint on all our parts.

All these circumstances in 1981 call for a U.N. which is more meaningful and more relevant to global concerns and events, not less. As the challenges to all of us increase in complexity and urgency, the need for more sophisticated, agile and responsive instruments to meet them grows apace. The problems of the rest of the century and