

Disarmament in 1978. At that time he suggested that the international community should attempt to reach agreement on four measures which, taken together, would slow down and eventually stop the strategic nuclear arms race. These measures were a comprehensive test ban; a ban on the flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic weapons systems. To date, the reaction of these proposals by the nuclear-weapon states has been less than enthusiastic. In particular, there is opposition to bans on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and, pending further progress in the SALT negotiations, on the flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles. We agree that SALT must have priority, but we will not abandon our ideas and we intend to raise them again as often as we believe it appropriate.

We are also pressing the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to complete their negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. We had hoped that a draft agreement might be reached before the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the current international situation has not made that possible. Meantime we are participating in work on the verification arrangements for a test ban.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence of willingness to slow down military spending on new strategic weapons systems, which is the fourth point of the strategy of suffocation. Unless we can reduce competition in new weapons technologies we will have little success in stopping the arms race as a whole.

But the ratification of SALT II and the beginning of negotiations on SALT III would be important indications that the development of new strategic weapons systems could be brought under control. These steps would indicate to the world that neither side wishes to create the impression of attempting to gain superiority, either by attacking the other in a first strike or by deliberate concealment of military capacities. Canada does not manufacture or purchase strategic weapons of any kind for her own use. Nor, in fact, do we have nuclear weapons. We are the only country really which has that capacity which has not taken advantage of it. We have to bear in mind the implications for control of new military equipment, and in each case ask two questions: is such equipment of a type which can be concealed easily? Does it threaten to upset the East-West military balance?

Disarmament studies

Canada is also contributing to United Nations studies on disarmament, especially those relating to the effects of nuclear weapons, confidence-building measures, and the relationship between disarmament and international development. For example the Department of External Affairs has funded two studies — one undertaken at l'Université Laval and the other at the University of Waterloo. The Laval study examines the impact that disarmament would have on the Canadian economy. The Waterloo study investigates the utilization of resources for military purposes in Canada and their impact on Canadian industry. Through contracts such as these as well as contributions to Canadian organizations concerned with arms control and disarmament, the Department has been encouraging research and stimulating public information activities in relation to arms control and disarmament. We have also