

efforts to liberalize trade has been steadfast and unreserved. We agree that NATO should continue to function as an instrument of collective defence. Like the United States, we see NATO's collective strength and the present situation of strategic parity as opportunities for developing a basis for political *détente* with Eastern Europe.

Thus I can assure our friends to the south that the Canadian Government views Dr. Kissinger's speech in its broad outline as a welcome reaffirmation and redefinition of an outward-looking and responsible American foreign policy.

But, looking at it from a Canadian perspective, as I must do, there is a potentially disturbing feature, and this may be as much a feature of our polarizing world as of Dr. Kissinger's address. And that is: where do Canadians fit into the developing pattern? Dr. Kissinger has identified three main power centres in the non-Communist world -- the United States, Europe and Japan. While we have no illusions about being declared a fourth power centre, we think we have a distinctive contribution to make and we don't want to be polarized around any of the main power centres.

We can take some comfort from the fact that, in his speech, Dr. Kissinger called on Canada along with Europe and, ultimately, Japan to join the United States in working out a new Atlantic Charter. To that call I have no hesitation in saying we will respond most willingly, the more so because it is within such a framework that Canada will have the best chance of avoiding polarization and of achieving the diversity in our economic, cultural and political relations that is fundamental to the strengthening of the Canadian identity.

This is exactly the sort of issue which I would like to see fully and vigorously debated by the press. We will need clear heads and wise judgments as this debate proceeds -- and the press has an important contribution to make.

Even with these issues properly identified and policy direction given, decisions have still to be made on the individual questions that present themselves almost daily in relations between Canada and the United States, questions about trade, about exchanges of energy, about cross-border investment, about industrial policy, about broadcasting policy. And, as our study of Canada-United States relations points out, that pursuit of the third option "does not seek to distort the realities of the Canada-United States relationship or the fundamental community of interest that lies at the root of it".

When the question of Canadian participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam was first broached, it seemed to me that here was a question with which large sections of the Canadian public were passionately concerned. Many of us had our own points of view, but there were also a large number of peripheral considerations to be taken into account. However, Canada was not itself directly involved in the negotiation and the need for confidentiality was secondary, in my opinion, to the need of keeping the public informed. If people tell you things in confidence, you cannot make them public the next day. But, to the extent that we were dealing with Canadian responses, I decided that at every new turn of events the Canadian public would be kept informed of what had happened and what the Government proposed to do next. I even tried, with only partial success I regret to say, to enlighten the opposition parties by offering them a chance to see for themselves what was going on in Indochina. Naturally, I was very pleased to see that the general lines we were following commanded a wide measure of approval and this became a source