There has been a good deal of talk in the last week or two here, in the United States and across the seas, about this new defence strategy, or new defence concept, that is sometimes referred to as the "New Look". It was also referred to by the Vice-President of the United States in his broadcast a couple of weeks ago as a "new course". On the other hand, it was described by President Eisenhower, in his press conference last week, as "no new doctrine at all."

Whether it is new or old it is extremely important. In the words of Mr. Dulles, it means "local defence reinforced by mobile deterrent power". It means refusal to be tied to any rigid strategy, to any fixed planning, and it gives the nations of the coalition, it is hoped, more freedom of manoeuvre.

This old, or new doctrine, whatever you wish to call it, was dealt with in considerable detail by the United States Secretary of State in his speech in New York on January 12. He confirmed his views on this strategy at his press conference on March 17 in Washington when he said, and I quote from his remarks as reported in the New York Times:

"I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the greatest deterrent, and that when you are faced with that kind of potential enemy, or with the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe, that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war."

So far as I am concerned I do not criticize the view that this kind of strategy is a valuable deterrent against aggression, and a shield for defence. In my speech in Washington last week I went out of my way to say that I did not criticize it as such because it might very well be the best deterrent against war at the present time. What I thought was important, however, was to clarify some of the ambiguities of this new strategy, and to make it as clear as possible to us all where we stood as friends and allies in relation to it.

Within the last few weeks some very important and reassuring clarifications have been made in Washington of what seemed to some of us to be obscurities. I believe that has been a good result. I know that personally I feel better after having heard some of these statements.

The sentence on which I concentrated my attention in Mr. Dulles' January speech, and it is a sentence which has become pretty well known by now, is as follows. I am quoting from Mr. Dulles' speech made in New York on January 12:

"...before military planning can be changed the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions."

then he went on:

"This has been done. The basic decision was