

While force levels which constitute effective deterrence regarding ballistic missile use would preferably be delivery systems armed only with conventional warheads, it would be unrealistic in certain regional situations to seek or expect an immediate rollback of WMD capabilities. Rather, emphasis should be placed on the capabilities of conventional weapons as deterrents to ballistic missile use. Because rollback of WMD capabilities is unlikely in the absence of reduced tensions, a cap on WMD acquisition may be the best solution of the moment. "No first use of WMD" declarations, coupled by agreements not to covertly deploy ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, would have a calming effect in certain regional hot spots. Over time, establishment of nuclear-weapons- and ballistic-missiles-free zones in a region would greatly increase strategic stability.¹¹

Verification of agreements associated with non-deployment, or restricted deployment, of ballistic missiles must take into account certain logistical differences between liquid- and solid-propelled ballistic missiles. Liquid-propelled ballistic missiles require considerable time to move, erect, fuel, spin up the gyros, and fire. They must be transported empty; they must be accompanied by fuel trucks; they must be erected and fueled; and their guidance gyros spun up before launch. All of these activities take time and are subject to observation. Solid-propelled missiles do not require all of these activities; thus, they can be moved, erected, and fired in much less time and with far fewer observable features. Consequently, the nature and verifiability of possible cooperative measures or agreements will vary greatly depending on the types of ballistic missiles involved.

Another important element in the development and deployment of ballistic missiles involves the associated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) capabilities. While large numbers of ballistic missiles create regional instability, poorly-controlled missiles raise the potential for accidents and unauthorized use. Alternative delivery system capabilities, most particularly strike aircraft, would allow weapons to be recalled when they have been mistakenly launched, although maintenance of the infrastructure associated with strike aircraft is an expensive undertaking for some developing countries.

Cooperative efforts to inform regional parties of ballistic missile test launches and space vehicle launches, including the location, timing, and purpose of the launch, would reduce the perception of a possible threat.

¹¹ The authors of this paper reject the argument made by Kenneth Waltz, Devin Hagerty, and others that proliferation has stabilizing effects; specifically, Waltz, Hagerty, et al. claim that nuclear weapons have deterred war between their possessors and will continue to do so. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. Hagerty applies this theory to South Asia in "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," *op. cit.*