

1995), 6-12; David Gillies, "Evaluating National Human Rights Performance in the Developing World," Centre for Developing Area Studies Discussion Paper No. 58 (Montreal: McGill University, 1989); Alex P. Schmid, "Repression, State Terrorism, and Genocide: Conceptual Clarifications," in P. Timothy Bushnell, et al., eds., *State Organised Terror: The Case of Violent Internal Repression* (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 23-37. Discussions with Howard Adelman, Juergen Dedring, Jeremy Bristol, and Adeel Ahmed at the Humanitarian Policy Forum on Humanitarian Early Warning (Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 17 May 1996) also contributed to my approach here. Juergen Dedring, James Mayall, Charlie Jefferson, Andrei Dmitrichev, and David Carment provided comments and suggestions.

10. For some early warning analysts, the factors grouped in this category appear to be more like "accelerating" factors than structural, background conditions. As alluded to above in the discussion of Category B - Polarisation, this analytical framework focuses on political analysis of dynamic factors in conflict escalation. It thus largely dispenses with macro-level risk assessment of the relatively static elements that make up a country's human development and socioeconomic profile. The quantitative computer modeling and coded datasets typical of this sort of macro analysis are not, in and of themselves, well-placed to guide policy-makers on operational options in specific cases of conflict escalation. Because of this operational orientation here, "accelerators" become the relatively more static, or "structural", indicators. This confusing explanation demonstrates, perhaps, that these distinctions work better in theory than in policy practice.

11. This clarification was emphasised at the November 1996 workshop at CIDCM, U. of Maryland. I am grateful to Ted Gurr for explaining at that time this difference between the purposes of risk assessment as distinct from early warning. Readers will no doubt detect here, however, a definite preference on the part of this author for "small N", case-specific approaches rather than general observations based on "large N" presumptions that statistical significance is necessarily relevant for operational decision-making. Gurr has noted elsewhere that "Risk assessments are based on the systematic analysis of remote and intermediate conditions. Early warning requires near-real-time assessment of events that, in a high-risk environment, are likely to accelerate or trigger the rapid escalation of conflict." See Gurr, "Early Warning Systems: From Surveillance to Assessment to Action," in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 130-138.