consumption, or capital flight.7

For the proposal to be effective, recipient countries must also undertake simultaneously to reduce military expenditure and to give priority to social and productive sectors.

For many African countries, it is difficult to get accurate data if any at all on military expenditure. Much of the data is spread over many sectors and guarded as top secret. For purposes of obtaining some picture of the expenditure implications, we have used defence spending as presented in budgetary outlays as an indicator of military expenditure. Even with the knowledge that these data are probably lower than actual figures, defence expenditure is shockingly high (Table 3). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the six poorest countries with the highest military spending (Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Mali) include two from the Horn region. It is thus important that transparency in security matters be promoted so that a more realistic analysis of defence/development impact can be obtained.

Changing Priorities

The accompanying brief outlook of defence/military expenditure (see Appendix 3 on military spending) reveals that in all these countries, defence and security are given much higher budgetary or resource allocation priority than most developmental sectors. Only public or general administration competes with this sector. While one may argue that the high propensity to conflict naturally brings defence and security to the top of the agenda, the imbalance in allocation is extremely wide. For the period 1985 to 1992, only Kenya appears to have reduced defence expenditure. It might again be argued that Kenya has not faced any serious threat in that period, but neither has Tanzania.

⁷Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1988, p. 14.

⁸See discussion on military expenditure in Africa by Nicole Ball, "Effect of Conflict on Third World Countries," Deng and Zartman, pp. 272-91.

⁹UNDP Human Rights Development Report, New York, 1994, p. 57.