

has not always been particularly sensitive to operational difficulties in this respect, for example when adopting Resolution 836 of June 4, 1993 elaborating in ambiguous terms on UNPROFOR's responsibility for the protection of these newly created safe havens in Bosnia. The expectations created by the Council were glaringly at odds with the means at hand.⁸ Although the creation of the safe havens did work as a short-term tactic, the eventual result was disastrous for the civilians overrun in 1995 in Srebrenica. The UN's credibility was also seriously undermined.⁹ Thus, the use of force presented risks for the UN which were at times underestimated by the Council.

The Council has become increasingly influenced by **humanitarian considerations** in its decision-making, e.g. in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. This is partly as a result of the so-called CNN effect which projects selectively the world over some of the horrendous human suffering arising from conflicts, generating intense public pressure on governments and the UN to "do something"; and partly because the new dynamics within the P-5 have allowed the Security Council to experiment in the field of humanitarian intervention. In practice, humanitarian action involves the UN in difficult negotiations with diverse parties to a conflict for access to its civilian victims. Here, often heroic results have been achieved. However, when the parties find it to their advantage to withdraw or withhold their consent for UN humanitarian operations, the Security Council is faced with difficult

encompassed a significantly increased use of Chapter VII sanctions. Highly circumscribed diplomatic sanctions were also adopted against Sudan in SCR 1054 of April 26, 1996.

⁷ Prior to Desert Storm, the use of armed force had been authorized only in Korea (through SCR 83 of June 27, 1950 and SCR 84 of July 7, 1950) and the Congo (through SCR 161 of February 21, 1961 and SCR 169 of November 24, 1961). During the "era of euphoria" induced largely by the successful use of force against Iraq, the use of force was authorized in Somalia (through SCR 794 of December 3, 1992 and SCR 814 of March 26, 1993) and in Bosnia (through SCR 836 of June 4, 1993 on the protection of safe areas). It would again be authorized in 1994 in connection with Operation Turquoise in Rwanda and the activities of the Multinational Force in Haiti, both missions mandated by the Security Council but executed independently of UN command and control. (The sanctions against Rhodesia referred to in footnote 5 were, at one point, enforced by a Council-mandated UK naval blockade. However, it was never clear how much force the Council intended or authorized the UK to use and the case has remained somewhat moot.)

⁸ The UN Secretariat had pointed out to Council members that this resolution could not be implemented without a quantum leap in the numbers of personnel and the types of equipment which had hitherto been provided to UNPROFOR. While some troops were added, the numbers fell well short of the requirements identified by the Secretary-General.

⁹ For an interesting account of the improvisatory nature of much Security Council policy on Bosnia, including the "safe areas" concept - which the UN Secretariat did much to resist on the grounds that it could not be implemented, see Sir David Hannay, The UN's Role in Bosnia, Oxford International Review, Spring 1996, pp. 4-11.