adds additional confusion since there are so many types of missiles, especially when compared to weapons systems such as tanks. And these types have widely varying effects when attempting to determine the presence of an 'excessive and destabilizing' accumulation. A third problem arises in this category because not all types are included, for example, ground-to-air missiles and many types of air-to-air and antitank missiles. Since the reason for this exclusion is not made clear, it detracts from the credibility of the exercise, at least in this category. Finally, a critical and perhaps fatal flaw is the lumping together of missiles and missile launchers. Again, this category has its roots in Iraq, where the SCUD launchers became as important as the reloads themselves. However, as its stands, the category invites states to mask rather than illuminate their transfers in this category of weapons.

What about cheating and deception? Given the reality of national intelligence services, it is highly likely that there are a number of cases where the reporting has increased suspicion. Where an outside observer might chalk up discrepancies to lack of bureaucratic rigor, in reality deception and cheating cannot be ruled out. While it is highly likely that in the aggregate the Register captured 90-95% of the arms trade in the seven categories, the discrepancies are numerous enough to expect that bilateral diplomatic queries as to the veracity of specific national reports have occurred. One can imagine someone in the various national intelligence services drawing the assignment of comparing the Register returns to the intelligence data. But that is one of the purposes of the Register, to make data transparent and then deal with neighbours or others who have doubts about their validity.

As the following chart indicates, there was wide variation in reporting and creation of data by region. Part of this was due to the varying regional experience with transparency exercises and the presence of national bureaucracies, such as those in Europe and North America, accustomed to generating military data of this sort. Regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa are at a comparatively low level of militarization, at least as concerns these seven categories of major weapons, and have little need to have such a data generation capacity at this point in their young history as a system of independent states. In Latin America and some parts of Asia, a different factor may explain the varying levels of participation, namely civil-military relations. Producing transparent and therefore public data for the United Nations may go against the norm and in some cases the laws in these countries, where the military has used its expertise in such areas to guarantee and in some cases force a political role in the country. Finally, one of the critical realities made clear by the first year of reporting is that in the former Soviet Union, national export control systems were in varying stages of development in the wake of the collapse of the USSR. This makes it very difficult to assess the first year of the Register in this region, since the public perception was that of a region awash with the continued production and export of arms, but little was reported to the Register.