

planation. If we reject this, we are left in the most profound ignorance of the whole subject.

But when we come to the moral side of man's nature, Darwinism still more signally fails. There is, says Matthew Arnold, "a power in the universe which makes for righteousness." But what is this power? It is not a line of conduct or a system of philosophy based upon human experience: we may discover it, but we do not create it. Reverence or worship, says Darwin, in man, is analagous to the affection which a dog has for his master, or a monkey for his keeper. It differs from the attachment which one of these animals has for another of the same species, in this, there is besides affection, a sense of dependence and inferiority. In their upward march towards humanity, they take these traits with them. After transmutation they were necessarily continued, and sought an appropriate object for their exercise; and so Deity is called into existence, by faculties created during the progress of the animal race, which demands a superior being upon which it may spend its force, and this it finds in its sovereign, its priest, or its Creator.

Remorse is defined to be the sense of regret which one feels from not having followed a persistent instinct. Can this be true? Whence has come the regard for truth, and the detestation of falsehood? Can we explain it by this doctrine? Some regard falsehood as allowable in war, and as a venial offence in Trade and Com-

merce. How, then, could such an origin invest truth with sanctity? How could it induce men to value truth for its own sake, and to practise it regardless of consequences? Unless we admit there is a Judge of all the earth who does right, and who has, in the original constitution of man, implanted a moral capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, we have no intelligible explanation.

I have thus far dealt with external remedies for physical ills which fall within the law of co-adaptation; but there are moral imperfections and moral ills to which man is heir. Their existence is as obvious to human observation as accident or disease. Is there no remedy for such? Is there in the moral constitution of the universe nothing provided as a specific for the rooted moral evils? We see in the physical constitution, the recuperative powers are aided by external remedies; that there are germs of disease which no power within us can eradicate, and so we have learned by experience, to seek remedies without. Is the order in the moral world the same? It is at this point that that which is invisible seems to harmonize with that which appears. It is at this point that what Professors Tait and Stewart call the invisible universe would seem to differ but in a slight degree from the visible universe. I have said enough to show that the missing links in Darwinism are far too numerous, and too important, to justify its acceptance as an hypothesis of Creation.

