

religion, are not powerful enough in their hold upon men in general to effect their realization. For example, it is a serious question whether altruistic ethical doctrines which require disinterested philanthropy would be long put in practice without the support of religious belief in a common Father of all, each of whose children is to be loved and served, not only for his own sake, but for the Father's sake.

In regard to the objection that religious organizations, *i.e.*, the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, have outlived their usefulness, it is to be granted that "churchly dogmatism and ecclesiastical supremacy" should give place "to the development of the true religio-ethical disposition," and "to the awakening and strengthening of the feeling of duty, of love and of confiding hope." This desired reform can not be accomplished on the Ethical Society basis, but must be done "in the name of the eternal religio-ethical Idea." Hence the church will continue to be the legitimate and powerful representative of the moral and religious life. "Those who are in earnest in demanding a truly ideal morality and a truly ethical community must labor, not for a morality outside of the church, but for a reformation within the church."

Finally, the thesis which Prof. Pfleiderer maintains against all the above objections to the union of morality and religion is: "Moral sanction must have a transcendental ground; it must have as its basis some absolute or super-subjective rational will, *i.e.*, God." Thus the principle that I am seeking to establish, namely, that the religious life is an essential condition of the highest morality, is confirmed.*

(g) Having shown that morality, considered from the philosophical point of view is grounded in the absolute life, bringing morality into vital relation with religion, which has the same ultimate object, there is but one conclusion to be reached, namely, that one who is to be thoroughly moral should live conscious of the complete meaning of moral obligation, which is, in short, to have the worshipful spirit; that is, one must not stop short in the subjectivity of the moral nature. If it be true that the moral law has an ultimate basis in the divine

*Otto Pfleiderer, *Philosophical Review*, Sept., '96, pp. 449-472. Versus Pfleiderer, see Prof. Eliza Ritchie, *International Journal of Ethics*, January, '97, pp. 180-191.