

shouldering new burdens for the welfare and development of the less-favoured regions.

Moreover, in the short perspective, the Community has fallen far short of many of the objectives it has set itself. The Economic and Monetary Union is, by general admission, stalled; industrial policy has been much discussed, but positive action is elusive; energy policy seems easier to define and implement at a broader international level than within the Community; and regional policy, while some progress has been achieved with the creation of the development fund, remains a modest endeavour. All in all, the balance-sheet of achievement beyond the Customs Union is short and neither the latter nor the Common Agricultural Policy is functioning quite as well as intended.

The brief history of the European Community has been marked by recurrent crises that have seemed to call in question the viability of the institution and the validity of the idea of European unity. Time and again, however, experience has refuted pessimism. Although the processes of the Community are tortuous and lengthy, and such progress as it achieves is at the cost of enormous effort and expenditure of midnight oil, yet there have been steady advances and the disappointments tend to reflect failures of a grasp that is exceeded by the reach of European ambition.

It would be a rash prophet who dared forecast whether the European experiment will succeed. It is clear that the die is not irreversibly cast for success or failure. Nor

is the mould set firmly in favour of particular solution. However, the political challenges of the postwar era remain as basic facts of the European condition beyond the current flux, and Community response, imperfect and tant as it may seem in detail, has remarkable success contained those challenges. It is, indeed, ironic that this success, by disarming the threats that brought the Community into existence, has removed some of the sense of purpose and urgency upon which progress towards European union depends. And yet a measure of optimism is justified -- the some truth in the conviction of the founding fathers that European integration would generate a momentum of its own and that success would, in the last resort, be impossible to deny.

There is, of course, much more at stake than simply the success or failure of a Western European institutional experiment. Postwar decolonization and the impact of modern technology have given all over the world to new forms of political and economic organization, which point towards solutions to the problems posed by new "ethnic" consciousnesses and national aspirations, new economic experiments. None of these experiments is as daring or as all-embracing as that upon which the nine states of Western Europe have been engaged for nearly two decades. It is not fanciful to say that their success or failure will condition and set a pattern upon what may reasonably be expected elsewhere for many decades to come.

*Experience
has refuted
pessimism*

Canada's link with Europe still not widely understood

By David Humphreys

Negotiations have finally begun with the goal of establishing a "Contractual Link" between Canada and the European Community. Although nearly five years of background work lie behind this foreign-policy initiative, it is neither widely understood nor widely appreciated by even reasonably well-informed Canadians.

At best, the initiative now moving into the hard home-stretch of bargaining could result in a most significant activation

of the Third Option. That is, we shall, in several years hence, find ourselves with greatly-strengthened economic and political relations with Europe, but with less dependence on our most vital foreign ally and customer, the United States. At worst, our relations will continue much as they have been, except for regular institutionalized consultation. Happily, the worst is unlikely given this uncertain vantage-ground.