and effective for the restraint of the species of electoral corruption which the writer has been condemning. In fact until the subject has been discussed in all its bearings, it would be unprofitable to undertake such a task. All that is now aimed at is to call the attention of the legal profession, and incidentally of the public at large, to the urgent necessity for amending the present law in such a manner as to check a very serious, and, as already stated a growing evil. The most effective, if not the only, remedy for that evil would seem to be the enactment of stringent statutory provisions based upon the recognition and acceptance of the idea, that acts, forbearances, promises, or declarations, which relate to the use of public money in a given community, and which have a natural tendency to influence the minds of the voters in that community, may with as much propriety be designated bribery, and subjected to the penalties of bribery as the more familiar forms of that offence which are now proscribed.

As the Provincial and Dominion Legislatures will shortly reassemble, the time is particularly opportune for a discussion of the questions here raised.

C. B. LABATT.

LIABILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS.

A case has been recently decided in the Supreme Court of Ohio (*Mason* v. *Moore*, 73 Ohio St. 275, 4 L.R.A. N.S.), in which the liability of bank directors is considered in relation to dishonest or improper practices on the part of officers of the bank. A writer in *Case and Comment* draws attention to this judgment in view of the vigorous denunciations which generally appear in the public press and elsewhere when the wreck of a bank takes place, and punishment of the directors is demanded on the assumption that if they had done their duty in supervising the affairs of the bank, loss to the shareholders would have been avoided. The writer says: "The Courts called upon to deal with the subject in all its aspects, with the responsibilty for