

revolutionary zeal. He compared the Cubans to the Chinese in this respect. Throughout the conversation, in fact, he made reference to the Chinese and the Cubans as the somewhat unruly immature sectors of the socialist world. He made it clear that Poland was siding with Soviet Russia in this conflict. At one time, for instance, he referred to a visit made by the President of Poland, Mr. Zawacki, to Peking a year or more ago. The latter had inquired when he could call on Mao Tse-tung. One morning he was awakened at 4:00 a.m. and told that the Chinese leader would see him in an hour's time, that is at 5:00 a.m. The Polish President was offended and declined politely the appointment. Later on he was offered another more convenient time with enough notice.

6. Mr. Winiewicz said that in the course of his talks with the Cubans and through other information sources, he was told that there are two countries in America which the Cubans would consider as being acceptable in any mediation job with the United States. They were, in this order, Brazil and Canada. When I said that Canada's selection surprised me a little in view of our membership in NATO, he said that the Cubans were, of course, aware of that but that nonetheless they placed a high trust in Canada's objectivity, disinterestedness and devotion to peace. However, in the present conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. over Cuba he was of the opinion there was nothing much the secondary powers could do. He felt that the leading countries of the world towered so high above the others that they alone had the means to prevent a situation such as the Cuban one from quickly degenerating into war.

7. Mr. Winiewicz on the whole remains confident that the United States and the U.S.S.R. will work out their differences and that relations between East and West are bound to be normalized over a period of years. He expressed himself clearly in favour of not allowing the Chinese or the Cubans to interfere in any process of rapprochement between the Soviet world and the West, particularly between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

J.L. DELISLE

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DEA/50128-40

*L'ambassadeur en Union soviétique  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Soviet Union  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 876

Moscow, November 29, 1962

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By Bag Berlin from Bonn.

CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV: ROCKETRY AND SOVIET MOTIVES  
ON CUBA-BERLIN AND DISARMAMENT

At various points in my long conversation with him Wednesday morning Khrushchev spoke of rockets in terms which I think throw some light on his motivation, and his tactical and strategic thinking regarding his actions on Cuba, Berlin, and disarmament.

2. Khrushchev said he had put rockets into Cuba as a deterrent. He did not repeat not explicitly qualify this merely as defence against American attack on Cuba (as he had done with