

includes in its broadest sense the defence of the nuclear retaliatory power of the United States, which is one of the principle NATO as well as North American defence objectives. Both require a common defence structure including the early warning system, interception, the dispersal of targets, and civil defence. Accordingly, for the purposes of planning and preparing these defences, it has been assumed that the air defences of Canada and the United States must be considered as one problem, and this has been agreed to at the Chiefs of Staff level. Planning may very well soon call for a substantial increase in the number of fighter squadrons based in Canada, particularly if the principle is accepted that efforts should be made to fight any air battles as far north of the settled areas of Canada as possible.

28. Coupled with the defence of North America and the defence of the nuclear deterrent power, so far as Canada is concerned, is the provision of facilities which may be sought by the United States on Canadian territory for the effective development of the deterrent power, that is, SAC operating bases. It may be expected that an increasingly significant proportion of the installations which are likely to be constructed in Canada in the next five to ten years will be for the Strategic Air Command and that an increasing number of United States personnel will be sent to Canada to man them.

29. In determining the share which Canada should bear in these defence activities, it is clear at least that Canada cannot assume exclusive responsibility for that portion which is operated directly by or for the Strategic Air Command. On the other hand, unless Canada assumes its share of responsibility for continental defence activities, which are more likely to involve combat operations over Canada than are SAC operations, there is a risk of losing effective control of these activities on Canadian territory. This risk would be particularly dangerous in view of the importance for Canadians of keeping any air battles which may be fought over Canadian territory as far north of the populated areas of Canada as possible. United States planners are not likely to feel the imperative of this consideration as acutely as Canadians, as an air battle fought over Canada's populated areas would be far enough north not to be a serious threat to U.S. targets. Present air defence plans do not adequately take account of this consideration; Canada's interceptor squadrons now operate mainly near settled areas, as evidenced by the presence of Air Defence Command at St. Hubert.

30. To judge the extent of Canadian participation which is necessary or desirable, it is necessary to strike a balance between the demands on Canadian resources of Western European defence and North American defence. Both are vulnerable to Soviet nuclear retaliation, but both come under the umbrella of United States nuclear deterrent power. This balance depends upon political and military considerations. The military considerations involve an assessment of the comparative degree of threat against North America and Western Europe; but since it must be assumed that one of the aims of the Soviet Union is to isolate North America from its Western European partners and thus disrupt NATO, the military threat cannot be divorced from the important political consideration of maintaining the unity of the Alliance which is itself an important element of the deterrent. It is presumably because of considerations such as these that the present United States policy envisages the maintenance of United States forces substantially at present levels in Europe, while building up the deterrent and means of defending it in North America.

31. Moreover, the degree of control exercised over continental defence by Canada depends not only on the extent of its participation in these activities, but also upon the form of the air defence command structure. The current concept of a coordinated rather than an integrated air defence system for North America stems from the joint declaration of 1947 on the principles of defence cooperation between the two countries, and in particu-