which the conductor, in his discretion, may think best. In this case the night was dark and cloudy, but from the place where the ejected man was left the lights of the last station were clearly visible, so the Court considered that the defendants' servants had not exceeded their authority: *(Ibid.)*.

Although a company may, as a general rule, make and enforce proper regulations on all passengers using their railway, still they cannot do so against a party who, in good faith and in ignorance of their regulations, has made a contract with one of the company's duly authorized agents; in which contract there has been no notice of, or reference to, the existence of some such regulation, which would have modified the terms or conditions of the contract: *Childs* v. *Great Western R. W.*, 6. U. C. C. P. 291.

It appears that one may pay his fare to one place, and yet may leave the cars at any intermediate place where the train stops, although the fare to the latter place may be greater than it is to the former: *The Queen* v. *Frere*, 4 E. & B. 598, and *Moore* v. *Metropolitan R. W.*, 8 Q. B. 36.

The rule has been laid down that a passenger, who purchases a ticket for a distant station and gets off temporarily, and without notice, invitation or objection while it is stopping at an intermediate station, does no illegal act; but for the time, he surrenders his place and rights as a passenger on the train, before it starts; and the officers of the railway are bound to give reasonable notice of the starting of the train: *State* v. *Grand Trunk R. R. Co.*, 4 Am. Rep. 258, 58 Me. 176.

In case of fighting or disorder in the cars, the conductor must do all he can to quell it. If necessary, he should stop the train, call to his aid the engineer, fireman, all the brakesmen and willing passengers, lead the way himself—like some valiant Knight of old—and expel the offenders, or else demonstrate by an earnest experiment that the undertaking is impossible: *Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & C. R. W.* v. *Hinds*, 7 Am. Reg. 14.

SELECTIONS.

THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BILL.

On the motion for the second reading of this Bill, Lord Hatherley expressed his entire concurrence in its essential provisions from beginning to end, and his great satisfaction at seeing such a measure in the very able hands of the Lord Chancellor. He believed no one would deny that the time had arrived to take decided steps with respect to the entire system of judicature, divided, as it now was, between the separate tribunals of common law and equity, and by the present Bill the opportunity was afforded of having a cause decided without suitors being bandied from one court to another. In forming the "divisions" of the court care should be taken hereafter to prevent any division being composed of persons of one sort of legal training, so that there should be gradually infused throughout the whole body of judges a feeling in favour of joint administration. It was important that the first part of the Bill should be tried without delay, but the appellate part of the measure was open to more discussion. It was desirable in the interests of the suitors that a single Appellate Court should be formed, sitting during the whole of the judicial year, and giving satisfaction by its uniform results. —Lord Chelmsford regarded the Bill as a great and comprehensive scheme, calculated to effect a vast improvement in our judicature. He did not see, however, that there could be complete fusion of equitable and common law jurisdictions so long as by the formation of "divisions" the old courts would be revived under a new name. He thought the judges should be interchangeable between the "divisions," and should have a joint jurisdiction. With regard to the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, he had long been of opinion that on account of its precarious character, it would be impossible to retain it if a better tribunal could be established, and the tribunal proposed by the Bill was, in his opinion, infinitely preferable, though he regretted that the appeals from Scotland and Ireland were to be excluded from the new Appellate Court, for it was desirable that one great and permanent Court of Appeal should be es-