

such a board, could be made responsible to Parliament, is to suppose an impossibility.

A still stronger objection to the plan is to be found in the proposed composition of the board. It is all one-sided. Ex-governors and other retired functionaries of colonies, and merchants and others resident for years out of the colonies, are not the men to be trusted as the sole advisers of the department. It is very well that they should advise ; but others should advise too. Men delegated directly from the colonies, practically acquainted with their respective circumstances, should be present to contribute their share of information to the department. The present wants and wishes of the colonies should be known as well as their past condition ; and the feelings of the many out of office represented, as well as those of the official few. In both these respects, the proposed composition of the board is faulty.

The more this subject is looked into, the more clearly we think it will be seen that the colonial minister ought not to be *controlled* by any " administrative " board with irremovable members—that he ought to have *advisers*, sufficiently numerous to ensure practical information from one or other of them, on every point on which he might have occasion for it—and that *among* those advisers there ought to be persons delegated from the several colonies to discharge that trust.

The importance of this subject demands for it a far larger share of attention—in the colonies especially—than it has ever yet received. Above all, it is no party subject, but one upon which all men should decide, without reference to party politics, imperial or colonial. On these two points we agree most heartily with our Toronto contemporary.