

*External Affairs*

Secretary General in his reports, of hopes and expectations which seem to us not unreasonable in the light of the prior actions of this assembly.

This statement of Mr. Lodge was followed by an extremely important communication of March 2 from President Eisenhower to the Prime Minister of Israel which may have been decisive in bringing about the withdrawal. I quote from that letter of President Eisenhower as follows:

It has always been the view of this government—

That is the government of the United States.

—that after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area—

That is the Gaza area.

—more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore.

Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your foreign minister and others.

Then said President Eisenhower:

I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations will seek that such hopes prove not to be in vain.

That is from President Eisenhower's letter of March 2. Mr. Speaker, those are the views as to what should be done. But the terrific responsibility of putting those views into action has been placed largely on the shoulders of the Secretary General of the United Nations. It is therefore important to try to understand what authority, under the resolutions that we have accepted, the Secretary General has for that purpose because very much indeed is left to him. We therefore are obliged to fall back on that resolution of February 2 which I have mentioned and leave it to the Secretary General to interpret that resolution and to implement arrangements based on it. That is going to be difficult for him to do. But if any man can do it, I think it is the Secretary General of the United Nations who is a man of devotion, integrity, amazing industry and diplomatic skill and fair minded. However, Mr. Speaker, this is not, I admit, too satisfactory a procedure though it may be the best possible that the United Nations Assembly was able to obtain having regard to the fact that a two-thirds majority of the assembly must be achieved for any resolution.

Let us then go back and see what are the responsibilities of the United Nations which the Secretary General is now to do his best to make effective; and I believe he is leaving tomorrow for the Middle East for that purpose. We stated in this house these responsibilities or these functions as laid down by

[Mr. Pearson.]

the general assembly resolutions, on November 27, beginning I think at page 61 of *Hansard*. We then pointed out in this house that these responsibilities were laid down or outlined in the Secretary General's report of November 6, which is the guiding document in this matter, especially paragraph 12 of that report. That report can be found on page 13 of the white paper dealing with the story of the Middle East already tabled in this house. Paragraph 12, the important paragraph of that report which contains the basic terms of reference for the Secretary General with regard to United Nations responsibility and particularly the functions of the United Nations emergency force, reads as follows:

. . . The functions of the United Nations force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of November 2, 1956.

It is therefore important to remember what were those other terms of the resolution of November 2. They were also given to the house by me in my statement on November 27 and 29 and they are also quoted on page 8 of the white paper. This resolution of November 2, which is basic in this connection—and it will be recalled that we were criticized by the official opposition for not voting against this resolution—includes the following provisions which should be recalled:

1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3. Recommends that all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of this resolution;—

And finally:

—4. Urges that upon the cease-fire being effective steps be taken to reopen the Suez canal and restore secure freedom of navigation; . . .

These functions as outlined by the secretary general in his report and based on the resolution of November 2 were approved by a resolution of the general assembly of November 7; and that resolution reaffirms the necessity for a scrupulous observance of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice terms. That reaffirmation was given again by the assembly in a resolution on February 2, passed by a vote of 56 to nothing, including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution of February 2, this reaffirmation of the scrupulous observance of the