

Chinese stocks; current and future nuclear weapons programs; Japan's and India's nuclear developments; and domestic politics.<sup>51</sup>

**Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).** China was most concerned with the issues of abandoned chemical weapons on its territories and verification. There are indications that should the issue be settled properly, that is, should Japan carry through its pledge to remove them, it may improve the chance of China's ratifying the CWC. On the whole, the Chinese approach to the convention has been serious. The military (represented by the Ministry of National Defence) clearly had a strong role in China's PrepCom participation. Meanwhile, the timing of ratification by the US, Russia, India, Japan will also have an important impact on China's decision. With regard to verification, China favoured a limited scope of on-site inspections (OSIs), and emphasised the need to maximise predictability and avoid abuse. Hence, China insisted that effective, reasonable, and feasible monitoring and verification measures should be established to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry while at the same time allowing legitimate production for civilian uses. It particularly warned against the tendency to broaden the scope of verification and place excessive emphasis on intrusive challenge inspections, with possible abuses of the verification process.<sup>52</sup>

**Anti-Personnel Landmines.** China continues to look at the issue of landmines from a security rather than humanitarian perspective, although the latter is increasingly becoming the dominant rationale for prohibition.<sup>53</sup> China's behaviour at the CCW, and in particular on the landmine issue, was characterised as non-co-operative to obstructionist. There is a strong (and probably inaccurate) impression that the Chinese position is influenced by its relations with the Khmer Rouge and other liberation movements, and highly ideological. The objection to banning landmines is that these are seen as legitimate weapons in the people's war and in rebellions against imperialists and the capitalist world. Keeping landmines out of the hands of non-state actors is the West's agenda, not China's. The essence here is that on matters of principle: China is not to let Western countries dictate the terms of negotiations. While China prefers not to be identified as a spoiler, it is prepared to stand alone to protect its vital interests. Indeed, China has so far refused to compromise on such issues as the use of identifiers to make mines detectable and a global ban on anti-personnel mines, which would force China to replace them with less cost-effective alternatives.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Liu, 'Evaluation and Analysis', pp.10-11; R. Bates Gill, 'Report on the Mission to the People's Republic of China', *Research Project: Nuclear Proliferation and World Order* (University of Leiden & Netherlands Atlantic commission, May 1995), p.10; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright and Yong Liu, 'China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off', *Survival*, Vol.37, No.4 (Winter 1995-96), pp.147-167.

<sup>52</sup> CD/PV. 406, pp.17-19; Ambassador Hou, CD/PV. 551, pp.4-5; CD/PV. pp.635, 29.

<sup>53</sup> I am indebted to Andrew Latham for calling my attention to this point. On China's position, see Rod Mickleburgh, "China reaffirms opposition to mine ban," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 November 1997, p.A12.

<sup>54</sup> Interviews with DFAIT officials. June 1996.