

however been addressed by the Standing Committee. The first concerns the resources required to make a success of the Arctic Council in the long haul.

The AEPS has been based on the coordination and redeployment of existing national assets. With very few exceptions, it has not seen the injection of new money. The March 1997 meeting of senior Arctic officials has confirmed what most expected for the Arctic Council: that there will be no new money for it either, notwithstanding the commitment of the Eight to broach the more challenging and potentially costly agenda of sustainable development. The projects proposed here for Arctic Council working groups should not entail any early requirement for significant new resources. Piggy-backing and recombination of available assets should do the job. But new resources including new money will have to be found if the Council is to move beyond study and standardization to action and especially pro-action on sustainable development. Now is the time to start strengthening the Arctic Council's capacity for action.

Even if the Eight were to become more liberal in the provision of resources as the affairs of the Council acquired greater standing at the political level in some or all of the circumpolar countries, there is sure to be a continuing gap between the ends and the means of sustainable development in the Arctic. To help narrow the gap over time, the EU and non-Arctic states such as China, Germany, and Japan could now start to be drawn into the work of the Council. Already the EU and within it Germany has a growing presence in the network of regional institutions, most notably in the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional Council. Japan has interests in Arctic marine transportation, and could well be associated with the work of the Arctic Council in this and other areas. China, which has extensive permafrost in its northern regions, is already a participant in the International Arctic Science Committee. It is also looking ahead to superpower status in the coming century.

In each of these instances there is an opportunity for Canada not merely to build a circumpolar dimension into its bilateral relations, but to help bring new resources to the Council in due course by starting now to encourage significant extra-regional actors to join in the work of sustainable development in the Arctic. There are difficulties here that extend well beyond a reluctance within the Eight to admit others into the affairs of what some still regard as a private preserve. Above all, there is the potential for non-Arctic actors with highly focused objectives not only to skew the priorities of circumpolar institutions, but to accentuate the development side of the sustainable development equation. Nevertheless, the Arctic is not and cannot be regarded as a region apart. On the contrary, it is linked in countless ways with its extra-regional and global surround. And its problems will not properly be addressed without reference to the surrounding environment.

The privileged status of the Arctic states and permanent participants in the Council's structure, combined with an informal and possibly an explicit understanding of basic principles of sustainable development in the region, will serve to ensure the prevalence of a circumpolar perspective that is attuned to the particular ecological, cultural, and socio-economic conditions of the Arctic. Accordingly, for Canada to offer leadership to the Arctic Council in associating non-Arctic actors with the institution would be not only to generate downstream resources for