

The second paper of the afternoon session, "Linkages Among Bilateral and Regional Confidence and Security Building Measures: The North Pacific Case," was presented by Ms. Janice Heppell. This paper assessed the opportunities for bilateral confidence building amongst the North Pacific states, stressing the complex set of potential threats with which each state must deal. These complex relations were seen to undermine the potential for broader, region-wide efforts. Modest bilateral packages were seen to be much more promising.

The paper first explored the nature of potential threats in the region, seen in the light of the post-Cold War world. Chief amongst a variety of potential concerns were a remilitarizing Japan; declining US presence and power; Chinese military modernization and a more aggressive security policy; and North Korea's clandestine nuclear programme. These concerns, to various degrees, were causing increased defence spending, the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons; the development of indigenous arms industries; and even the potential pursuit of programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction.

The presentation concentrated on the dynamics of relations between each pair of North Asian states. The point was to illustrate just how complex and uncertain those relations were and how the assessment of threat from those neighbours could shift, moving from the short- to the long-term. This assessment also included domestic developments that could alter the security relations of these states such as recession in Japan or the collapse of central authority in Russia or China. Japan, China, Russia, South and North Korea were each dealt with in turn. It was striking how each state could see a distinct threat posed by every other state in the region. This is what made developing security management approaches for North Asia so complex and difficult.

The second main portion of the presentation dealt with the potential role of confidence building measures in improving bilateral relations. The regional states could be seen in terms of ten bilateral relationships, structured by varying concerns about such priorities as economic growth, political reform, and military modernization. Eight of these relationships clearly could benefit from the development of measures to promote trust. Ms. Heppell suggested possible bilateral CBM regimes for each of these pairs of states. Most of the suggested regimes included basic collections of CBMs such as "no-first-use of force" declarations; the exchange of budget and force structure information; the exchange of officials (both regional and national); exchanges of and visits by military personnel; the notification of various types of military manoeuvres; the observation of military manoeuvres and activities; the establishment of "Hot Lines" (for emergency use) and "Cool Lines" (for the normal exchange of security information); and the creation of consultative groups or commissions to address specific types of security problems (such as nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear waste disposal; doctrine; and military modernization) or general issues of compliance. These CBM regimes stood as