

it expressed confidence that such a treaty would be signed before the end of June 1988. The statement contained detailed instructions on the "priority tasks" of the follow-up negotiations. However, no agreement was reached on the limits which the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 imposes on the development of defensive or "space" weapons, an agreement which Mr. Gorbachev said on his return to Moscow was a condition of any 50 percent cut in offensive weapons.

The meaning of the ABM Treaty is not the only obstacle to a second agreement on reducing nuclear weapons. Questions of verification, especially of sea-launched cruise missiles, remain to be answered. Nor can one assume that the issue of "linkage," especially to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, will not again be raised. However, on the whole, the negotiations appear to have received a political impetus that will be hard to stop. Certainly the NATO allies of the United States, including Canada, attach the highest priority to the substantial reduction of strategic offensive arms, and they believe that a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty is important to achieving such reductions.

These negotiations have important implications for Canada. Unlike the INF Treaty, which does not affect Canada directly, an agreement reducing the numbers of ballistic missiles might give new importance to long range cruise missiles carried by aircraft and submarines. If these approach Canadian territory and if we are to exercise adequate control over such territory, we shall need to respond. On the other hand, the failure of the negotiations would focus new attention on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the testing of which might well require Canadian co-operation at some future point. In both cases the government would be likely to face deep political divisions as well as new defence costs. It would be in the Canadian interest, therefore, that