

ferent social systems . . . The peaceful coexistence policy has nothing in common with the “freezing” of the social status quo. This policy — and in this lies its strength — proceeds from the objective content of historical progress, from the inevitability of struggle against exploitation and inequality as long as they exist in the world.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, there is little empirical support for the proposition that Soviet foreign policy in the Third World is unambiguously maximalist, zero-sum, and expansionist. Although in some ultimate sense this may be so, Soviet policy-makers have demonstrated considerable flexibility in their adaptation of tactics to capabilities and to prevailing domestic and international conditions. Moreover, the Soviets have fish to fry that are bigger than most Third World varieties. Historically, the Third World beyond the Soviet periphery has been a luxury, ranking well down the list of Soviet priorities. This is reasonably clear, for example, in current Soviet discussions of economic support for allied Third World states. The opinion is often expressed that the Soviet Union can not sacrifice its own economic growth to further Third World development. Soviet commentators also recognize the trade-off which exists between maintaining the central military balance and financing the revolution in the Third World, and hold that the former has to take precedence.<sup>9</sup>

Soviet behaviour is a product of a complex set of objectives, some common to all states, some peculiar to the Soviet Union. In the first place, like any actor in an anarchical state system characterized by endemic conflict over scarce resources, the Soviet Union has security problems. Much of its international behaviour appears motivated by a desire to increase its own power and to reduce that of its adversaries. This would probably be so, whatever ideological baggage its leaders had in tow.

In the Soviet case, these concerns about security are enhanced by both ideological and historical factors specific to the Soviet Union. Leaving aside the prehistory of violent incursions into the Russian heartland by armies from both east and west, since the 1917 revolution the Soviet regime and its people have experienced two extremely destructive foreign invasions. This heritage, and the per-

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<sup>8</sup> N. Inozemtsev, “Policy of Peaceful Coexistence: Underlying Principles”, in *Soviet Policy of Peace* (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1979), pp. 26-7.

<sup>9</sup> T. Zamostny, “Moscow and the Third World: Recent Trends in Soviet Thinking”, *Soviet Studies* XXXVI, #2 (April, 1984), pp. 230-1.