

were urged to take effective steps towards achieving acceptance of such safeguards as a necessary basis for the transfer of nuclear supplies to non-nuclear states.

As regards cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a number of positive recommendations were agreed upon, including international and multilateral collaboration in such fields as international fuel cycle facilities, spent fuel and nuclear waste storage, and international plutonium storage. In addition, the statement called for assistance in the case of an armed attack or threat of attack on safeguarded nuclear facilities, and also for greater assistance to developing countries in promoting their nuclear power programs.

A group of states, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, urged the separation of civilian and military nuclear materials and, in a rather weak compromise, the Final Document affirmed the great value to the non-proliferation regime of commitments by the nuclear powers that they would not use the nuclear supplies, provided to them for peaceful uses, to make nuclear weapons and suggested that the IAEA could verify observance of such commitments.

The above examples are illustrative of a large number of recommendations made with respect to safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In general it can be said that the recommendations made were more specific and detailed than those which had been agreed on previous occasions.

The greatest difficulties arose in Committee I concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The United States startled some delegations by the strength of its opposition to a comprehensive test ban, which it denied was the first step towards achieving the objectives of Article VI. Members of the US delegation considered that the uncertainties of verification of a test ban at the present time would make it a confidence-eroding measure rather than a confidence-building one; they claimed that negotiations leading to deep reductions of nuclear weapons were the best way to deal with the nuclear threat, and that this was in full harmony with Article VI.

The arguments of the US against a comprehensive test ban prompted Mexico and Sweden to make a strong defence of that measure both as a necessary first step and as an easily verifiable one. They maintained that a test ban would reduce the risk that cuts in the nuclear arsenals would be nullified by the development of new nuclear systems. Sweden also stated that its experience from a fairly dense seismic network in Sweden showed that detection capabilities of magnitude 1 could be obtained, that is, for explosions down to a yield of about 1 ton or .001 kiloton.

Due mainly to the position of the United States, which was supported by the United Kingdom, it was not possible to reach agreement in Committee I on a text dealing with a comprehensive test ban treaty, and the Committee's report contained a bracketed unagreed paragraph on that subject.

Since it seemed clear that no consensus could be obtained on the text submitted by Committee I, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico announced that he would propose several draft resolutions to the Conference and asked that they be put to the vote if no compromise could be reached.

THE ADOPTION OF THE FINAL DECLARATION

Three draft resolutions were prepared calling for

- (1) the resumption in 1985 of negotiations by the three nuclear powers for a comprehensive test ban treaty,
- (2) a moratorium on testing pending the conclusion of a CTB treaty,
- (3) a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

The members of the group of non-aligned and neutral countries decided to sponsor the three draft resolutions as their own, and they were introduced in the conference by Mexico as draft resolutions of the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States. The President of the Conference announced that, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, if no consensus agreement could be reached within 48 hours on the draft Final Declaration prepared by the Drafting Committee, the draft resolutions would be put to the vote on the last day of the conference on the expiration of the 48 hour period of deferment. He called in the meantime for renewed efforts to reach a consensus.

The submission of the draft resolutions brought a dramatic change to the entire situation and to the mood of the conference. Whereas up to that point the conference had proceeded in a businesslike but rather low-keyed, routine manner, it suddenly had reached a critical point that would be decisive for the final results of the work.

The Western and the Socialist countries, for different reasons, were very anxious to avoid a vote. The United States and its allies thought that a vote would divide the conference and weaken the NPT. They accordingly were prepared to agree to almost any reasonable compromise that could lead to a consensus and thus avoid the necessity of having to resort to a vote in which they feared they would be in the minority. They would have preferred a deadlock with no Final Declaration to being outvoted.