

proposal of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for a limited inspection scheme, the various proposals on the methods, objectives and rights of inspection and supervision advanced by both the United Kingdom and French Delegations as well as the plan of the President of the United States.

It is also encouraging that there is at least partial agreement in some areas of the problem facing us. The Soviet proposals for instance of May 10, which were reiterated by Premier Bulganin at Geneva, contain provision for setting up control posts the object of which is to prevent a surprise attack by one state upon another. We do not feel that the control posts as proposed by the Soviet Union would be adequate to achieve this objective but it is notable that the main objective of President Eisenhower's scheme for exchange of military information and reciprocal aerial reconnaissance is also to provide against the possibility of a surprise attack.

Now, when Mr. Sobolev spoke this morning he mentioned something that I had said in the course of one of the meetings of the Sub-Committee. I have not been able to take down Mr. Sobolev's exact words, but he said that in our Sub-Committee, on October 7, I, on behalf of Canada, had made a statement that we had now achieved a position on which a general agreement could be based. I should like to refer to the exact words I used in the part of my statement to which I presume Mr. Sobolev refers. What I said is this (and this was at the 68th meeting and is to be found on page 22, halfway down, of the Verbatim Record of that day's meeting). I observed:

"Regarding the substantive problem of disarmament, although the gap between the positions of the powers concerned has been reduced, it remains considerable. However, it seems to me that, on the major elements of a comprehensive disarmament plan, we are no longer faced by irreconcilable proposals. The various positions taken are now, so to speak, within a negotiating distance of one another. The opportunities offered here for frank and sincere explanations and for a patient exploration of mutually acceptable solutions have been invaluable. While we remain clear as to our ultimate goal and as to many of the important steps necessary to reach it, we must also take account of certain hard scientific facts, openly recognized by all delegations here, which throw some doubt on the practicability, at present, of guaranteeing a complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, scientific advances could well alter this situation and, as Mr. Moch has pointed out so clearly, atomic prohibition is not a simple, all-or-nothing proposition. We might even now devise a comprehensive disarmament programme providing for a very substantial easing of the threat of nuclear weapons."

I am sure Mr. Sobolev will appreciate that he would have given a clearer picture if he had also referred to the "hard scientific facts" mentioned in what I have just quoted.

And now, while I am not anxious to introduce a controversial note in our proceedings, it is necessary to point out that the Soviet agreement has been based on