

Finally, a procedure is established to enable the Peace Observation Commission to make an immediate investigation. The issue of a definition of aggression is avoided, but a Soviet proposal, laying down criteria by which aggression might be so labelled, was referred to the International Law Commission for consideration. This proposal which, as Mr. Pearson pointed out, contained no reference to "indirect aggression", was based on a somewhat similar set of criteria which had been advanced at the second session of the Disarmament Conference in 1933 by Mr. Litvinov.

In its second resolution the Yugoslav Delegation proposed that the General Assembly should set up a permanent commission of good offices as a means of mediating in international disputes. Following a brief general discussion this proposal was referred to the Interim Committee as part of that body's study of United Nations conciliation machinery.

The item entitled "declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations" was discussed on the initiative of the Soviet Delegation, which had chosen this means of injecting the "Stockholm" peace appeal into the Assembly's deliberations. Apart from this new theme, the body of the Soviet case differed very little from the propaganda proposals which the U.S.S.R. had sponsored in 1948 and 1949. Reduced to its essentials, the resolution tabled by the Soviet Delegation called for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and for a system of international control; declared that the first government to use the atomic weapon, or any other means of mass destruction, would be committing a crime against humanity and would be regarded as a war criminal; and urged the Great Powers to reduce their armed forces of all kinds by one-third during 1950-51. The only new element among these recommendations was the proposed declaration that the first government to use the atomic bomb should be branded as a war criminal, a theme which had found frequent expression in the publicity which had accompanied the "Stockholm" peace appeal.

In spite of the familiar propaganda tone of this resolution, determined efforts were made by many delegations in the Political Committee to ascertain whether or not the 1950 version of the Soviet protestations represented a genuine desire to resume negotiations with the non-Cominform powers. Hope that these efforts might be fruitful was increased by a statement which Mr. Vishinsky made in the Committee on November 23 when he introduced the Soviet resolution. Mr. Vishinsky's statement was notable for its unusually heavy emphasis on the theme of the U.S.S.R.'s peaceful intentions towards the rest of the world. At one stage in his statement he asserted that Soviet policy was based on the idea that "peaceful co-existence between the Soviet system and capitalist states for a very long period was not only possible but unavoidable". Moreover, it appeared from what Mr. Vishinsky said regarding atomic weapons that the U.S.S.R. might be genuinely willing to enter into negotiations on the question of the inspection and control of atomic energy.<sup>1</sup> There was a rapid reaction to this section of Mr. Vishinsky's state-

<sup>1</sup>See "Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments", pp. 48-50.