

Majesty's civil government, and are not connected with the administration of justice.

"The Governor in chief does not, however, flatter himself that there will be any such surplus; he therefore calls upon the Assembly for the supply necessary for defraying the several expenses of those different local establishments and objects of public charge, to which he has referred, and which appear by the expenditure of last year, which he has caused to be laid before the Assembly in this session, will amount to about thirty-five thousand pounds, including the expenses of the legislature, and of the collection of the public revenue.

"The Governor in chief deems it his indispensable duty to add, that, if these supplies are not granted, he will have no means to defray the expenses of these local establishments and objects of public charge, except when payment has been provided by specific appropriations."

I have copied the whole of this message, as it may be considered as part of the Governor's opening speech of the present session: and it implies, first: that the Governor will not admit that the Assembly ought to call in question the constitutional principle whether he has, or has not, a right to apply the public monies to the public services for which they may have been appropriated, in the quantum and modes which he thinks proper. Next that, in default of supplies being granted by the Assembly, he is the judge from what funds, and in what way, the public exigencies shall be supplied, and that he has a right to pay the King's servants, in preference to public charges that come under the designation of local or provincial establishments. And from the speech itself, it would seem moreover, that it is not the intention of the Executive to submit to the House of Assembly, any other estimate than those for local establishments; meaning thus to use its own pleasure in appropriating the duties paid by the province at the port of Quebec, excepting only what may have been set apart for such local purposes.

Thus the Executive would assume the power of making use of what portion it pleases of the people's money, without the consent or controul of the people's representatives, paying such officers as it pleases, making Jacks of some, and Jills of others, paying them what sums it pleases, and for what periods it pleases, and leaving such matters unprovided for as it pleases.— This system would be so repugnant to all English feeling of right that we need only look at what it would produce, to unite in execrating, and resisting it to the utmost of our power.

The Imperial parliament would, under such a system, impose taxes upon the goods consumed by the people of these provinces, without any agent or representative at home, on the part of this country, without allowing them to give, or even have, an opinion on the subject, without even communicating what was