

terated lead, using the identical stamp which imprint the royal insignia on the coin as it issues from the mint. The counterfeit was good enough to deceive many people and be external rely circulated, for it at once assumed the look of genuine coin after being used some time. All the circumstances seemed to point to the conclusion that the servant was merely the tool, or at least the accomplice, of the Amin-es-Sultan himself. The latter, however, being the great friend of the Shah, escaped scot free, while the poor devil of a servant was

CHOKED TO DEATH IN A HORRIBLE MANNER on the Coop Capon, (the public square where the executions take place. The rest of the gang (for there had, of course, been a gang) escaped. And not even this much would have happened in the way of appeasing "outraged justice" if it had not happened that the Chief of Police just at this time is on bad terms with the Amin-es-Sultan.

A curiosity in its way was a letter that by accident got into my hands for a little while. It was a letter written by an American (I'll omit the name and place) to the Shah. It was couched in the most offhand and unaffected terms, but was otherwise quite a production. The correspondent started out by saying that he had read with pleasure the recent articles of Mr. Benjamin, the late American Minister to Persia, on Iran and her people and ruler. He thought, however, several things were needed to make the Shah's happiness complete. Russia, he might be astonished to learn, had designs on his country, and his Majesty ought to be better prepared for the onslaught which was sure to come within a few years. He (the writer) had heard that the Persians were quite skilful in the use of the bow and arrow, an accomplishment which probably dated from the time of Cyrus; also, that they were equestrians. Now, what he proposed to do was this: To hold annual sharpshooting festivals at Teheran, the winners to get big prizes, ranging from \$100 to \$1000 to invite the nobility of the land to tender their services for nothing as officers, and to form sharpshooting companies of 100 men each, they to be paid in a manner not yet decided. At the head of this whole scheme the Shah would need to put an active, intelligent man—and that man would have to be the writer. Then followed some biographical details. The correspondent, then, was a man of about 40, of good build and address, and of a character and mode of life against which the tongue of slander had never been raised. He, furthermore, was a childless widower, and could see no good reason why he should not sever present connection with his native village and come over here to

HELP THE SHAH OUT OF HIS TROUBLE.

Of course for a consideration, which must be less than \$10,000 a year. If the Shah said that this was what he wanted a person giving his name and the address of his village, to be left till called for. At last accounts he made up his mind as to the kind and manner of his life, with a bleeding heart, when he thought that the Shah's Majesty was so much in need of such a safe place and

INTELLIGENT LIVING.

BY A MORALIST.

It is the lot of most persons who have had any large personal experience to regret that they have failed in certain moments of difficulty or mental and moral embarrassment to take what are called "sensible views" of life. What precisely is meant by a "sensible view" it may be difficult to define, but the general idea would seem to be one of good—i. e., prudent—policy. To take a sensible view of life we understand as being to view the situation from a sagacious standpoint and to act with wisdom in pursuing the course of conduct such a view suggests. Sensible views are not commonly sympathetic to views or views likely to be taken by persons who feel strongly on questions of personal or general interest, or who are either very selfish or particularly concerned for the feelings of others. A sensible view is generally a "judicial" or cold-blooded view, and therefore the last view in the world any hot-headed or warm-hearted person is likely to take. Nevertheless it is clearly the view which ought to be taken, and which experience abundantly shows we err grievously, some times even ruinously, in not taking. Sensible views are not as a rule pleasing or even at a time tolerable views of life. They call for what seems to be self-sacrifice, and require a deal of the sort of courage which shows itself in flying in the face of feeling and doing violence to sentiment. Those are happy who can take these views and survive the effort necessary to carry them into effect. For the virtue involved in such a triumph there will be a recompense of self-approval later on. Sensible views of life are invariably right views—that is, "right" in the sense of being worldly-wise—and those who have the wit and grace to profit by them are, in the long run, happier and better than the less "intelligent" by whom sensible views are encumbered or neglected. All this and much more may and ought to be said in praise of sensible views of life; and yet while feeling impelled to write on the subject, we must own a certain sort of regret in having to praise the policy experience bids us applaud. We would fain blame the prudence we are constrained to bless.

Sensible views are calm and clever views. They must be formed in moods which admit of the exercise of a wholly dispassionate judgement. There is no room for feeling with respect to the question raised or the way it may effect self in the immediate present, unless indeed the issue be one of urgent and limited scope; but with respect to issues of this nature it is almost impossible to think or act sensibly. The mind must be so well balanced and self-constrained as to be able to look every point of importance fully in the face and to weigh impartially each argument for or against alternative lines of action. In short, a sensible view has little or nothing to do with sentiments or sensations of a personal sort. It is above and independent of the emotions, pleasure, bliss or otherwise, by which most of us are consciously or without our own knowledge influenced in for ming a view of any stage or turning point in life and in determining how to shape our conduct in relation to it. What are the actual, as distinguished from the apparent, facts of the situation? In what relation do we really stand to them. Setting aside our personal sense of the case, its opportunities and requirements? What would some ideal person whom we have made our example or model of prudence do if he or she were in our place? How will the matter appear in after-years when we come to look back upon it? These are some of the

questions which lie at the foundation of a sensible view.

It is barely possible to obtain an accurate view of the facts of any situation while we are in the midst of it. We can form no artistic judgment of the effect of any group of which we are ourselves members. It is necessary to step outside a house to look at it; and it is almost impossible to form a clear notion of any set of circumstances while we stand at their central point and they surround us. This is why so many otherwise sensible persons are grievously in the management of their own affairs or the business-matters of those very closely related to them. A wise man will not trust himself when in a position of this kind to act as his own counsellor. Even though it be distasteful to take advice, and still harder to act upon it when it does not accord with our own notions of need or duty, yet it is better to make the necessary sacrifice of feeling and submit to the counsels of an impartial adviser than to take a wrong view, form a bad judgment, and afterwards pay the penalty of mistake in a lifelong regret or discomfort. These who rely too implicitly on their own judgments court, if they do not also deserve, failure. They cannot take the first step towards entering upon a path of safety; they do not know where they are or what lies around and before them. Sensible persons ought to recognize that the first condition of a sensible view is a clear perception, and that this is impracticable when the facts to be perceived and judged are inseparable from their own position and interests.

The relation in which they really stand to the facts of any perplexing situation is hidden from the eyes of those who are themselves personally interested in the imbroglio. In the attempt to discover and trace the path of duty we are sure to be misled by our own idea of what might or is in our judgment likely to happen in circumstances of which we can form no impartial conception. We cannot tell what may or ought to be done, because personal wishes, longings, and fears confound and pervert our notions of the facts, and must vitiate any estimate we may try to form of the probabilities. A man is always liable to error when he attempts to form a conception of the opportunities or requirements of a situation in which he is himself to be a principal actor; but the risk is quadrupled when the view on which he bases his notion of the case is also the outcome of his own judgment alone. We think we see how good may be done, how danger may be avoided, crooked paths made straight, adverse influences antagonized or diverted; we think we can detect the openings that exist and the needs which have to be satisfied; whereas all the while we are only dreaming, mistaking for facts what are mere fancies, and laying our plans and calculating probabilities for a situation which is wholly unlike the one actually before us, and exists only in our own imagination. The blunders which are made with good intent and by well-meaning and "sensible" persons are not so much errors of judgment as mistakes as to the basis on which the judgment rests. Right-minded men and women generally reason well enough; but they are wrong as to their data, and so they go astray. If the facts had been as they saw them, the course of conduct they marked out for themselves would have been worthy and repaid its rewards; but as to the real nature of these facts they were at fault, and therefore they wholly mistake the situation, with its opportunities and requirements, and entirely

misjudged their own position with its obligations.

The prudent question to ask is, What would some ideal philosopher do if he were in our place? Every one should have ideal or guiding Example and Mentor. The example we set before us ought to be the very highest we can conceive of, and it should be our daily pleasure and duty to enrich and perfect the image of absolute wisdom we have taken as our guide. There are for all men and women, and always will be, circumstances and positions in life which do not admit of an appeal to any confidant of like nature with ourselves; but there can be no condition which prevents a secret appeal to the guardian angel of our existence. No doubt the feeling of need to which we now point has been the origin of the belief in the patronage of saints. In itself that idea is one of great beauty and eminently adapted to the needs and weaknesses of our common humanity; but there is no suggestion of prayer or of worship due to the ideal in the thought we are trying to place before the reader. We speak simply of an inner and ideal conception of character which may or may not be connected with the story of any actual life. What we suggest is the mental conception of a wise being resembling ourselves as regards the surroundings and contingencies of life, and yet wholly unlike us in being perfectly wise and pure and good—in short, an exemplar of our own character perfected. What would such a one do or avoid in a situation like that which beets us? How would he or she escape its perils? How would he fulfill its obligations? How would he meet its requirements? The great advantage of this change of personality obviously is that we are able to look at any matter in question from an outside standpoint, and we may in this way take a sensible view of life in its personal relation. We can follow out the imagination any line of action which offers for our consideration and note the probable issue in contrast or comparison with that which we judge to be imperative. By withdrawing self from the drama and substituting another personality which fills our place, we are able to form an approximately impartial judgment. We strongly commend this plan to our readers as one very likely to be useful, and which has proved of good practical value to those who have tried it. There is, as we have remarked, scarcely any experience which is not marred by mistakes of some sort. The difficulties, the pitfalls, the traps, the devious paths of life are many and embarrassing. It is hard to go straight, try how we will. Many of the best-hearted, the most solicitous about well-doing, and, on the whole, the most discreet among us make awful mistakes and involve themselves and others in great and inextricable perplexities.

This is not, as we have said, because they are careless and incompetent, but because they do not form correct notions of fact and clear and calm judgments of expediency. They err by trusting to their own judgment in matters affecting their personal interests and by acting under the influence of personal feeling. Sensible views of life must not be swayed by our own sense of the situation in which we are placed. We must be sensible or sagacious enough to set aside the personal self and choose our ideal *alter ego* as best friend and adviser, taking our views of life as the ideal sees or shapes them. It is idle to expect to find the "sensible" view of any situation agreeable to our own predilections. The proper course of conduct in a difficulty is seldom that which commends itself most powerfully to our instincts. Indeed, looking to the lesson of